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I. INTRODUCTION

T

he financial crisis and resulting rise in home foreclosures has
drawn a great deal of attention in recent years. 2 As housing
prices fell and mortgage defaults grew, the financial services
industry began to complain about a perceived increase in
“strategic defaults.” 3 A strategic default is a voluntary mortgage
default and the subsequent abandonment of the home by a
homeowner who has the financial ability to pay the mortgage.
There is considerable debate among contract scholars about the
morality of this action and I leave that debate to them. 4 A more
practical question is whether strategic defaults actually occur.
Numerous researchers have tried to determine the circumstances
2
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC
CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES, 280-91, 402-10 (Jan. 2011) [hereinafter
Commission Report].
3
See generally FICO, FICO HELPS TOP MORTGAGE SERVICER COMBAT
STRATEGIC DEFAULTS: $20 BILLION PROBLEM FACING MORTGAGE INDUSTRY
CALLS
FOR
IMMEDIATE
ACTION,
(Oct.
10,
2011),
http://www.fico.com/en/Company/News/Pages/10-10-2011.aspx; Keith Jurow,
Strategic Defaults Revisited: This Could Get Very Ugly, BUS. INSIDER (Apr.
29, 2011, 10:18 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/strategic-defaultsrevisited-it-could-get-very-ugly-2011-4.
4
See generally Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Breaching the Mortgage Contract:
The Behavioral Economics of Strategic Default, 64 VANDERBILT L. REV. 1547,
1582-83 (2011) (recognizing that due to the bad behavior of banks and the
remote connections homeowners have to the lenders in a world of
securitization, homeowners have fewer moral qualms about default); Brent T.
White, The Morality of Strategic Default, ARIZ. L. STUD. (Discussion Paper
No.
10-15,
May
2010),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1597835 (arguing that
strategic default can be economically rational, and thereby a moral decision).
But see Curtis Bridgeman, The Morality of Jingle Mail: Moral Myths about
Strategic Default, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 123 (2011) (arguing that true
strategic default, defaulting when you can afford to pay the mortgage, is not
morally defensible); William Redmond, Strategic Foreclosure as an Indicator
of Eroding Institutional Structures, 2 J. ECON. ISSUES 565 (2012) (arguing that
the social acceptability of voluntary foreclosure is growing). For a broader
discussion, see Meredith R. Miller, Strategic Default: The Popularization of a
Debate Among Contract Scholars, 9 CORNELL REAL EST. REV. 32 (2011);
Steven Shavell, Is Breach of Contract Immoral, (Harvard John M. Olin
Discussion Paper Series, Discussion Paper No. 531, Nov. 2005), available at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/Shavell_531.pdf
; Seane Shiffrin, Could Breach of Contract be Immoral?, 109 MICH. L. REV.
1551, 1552 (2009).
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under which homeowners choose strategic default. 5 However,
strategic defaults are not easily quantifiable because, as one
industry study explains, “while the total number of defaults can
be measured with a high degree of precision, whether or not those
defaults are due to an inability to pay or an unwillingness to pay
is typically unobservable from market data.” 6 Therefore, the
evidence to support the contention that the foreclosure crisis was
caused by widespread strategic default is mixed, at best. 7 The
Currently, two general theories predominate: the strategic or ruthless
default theory that holds that people will default when their mortgage exceeds
their home equity by a defined threshold and the “two trigger” school which
holds that the home equity differential, in and of itself, does not cause default.
It must be combined with some kind of life crisis like divorce or job loss. Neil
Bhutta, Jane Dokko, & Hui Shan, The Depth of Negative Equity and Mortgage
Default Decisions (Div. of Research & Statistics & Monetary Affairs Fed.
Reserve Bd., Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series, Paper No. 2010-35, 2010), at 3,
available
at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2010/201035/201035pap.pdf.
See
generally Younghend Deng, John M. Quigley, & Robert van Order, Mortgage
Terminations, Heterogeneity, and the Exercise of Mortgage Options, 68
ECONOMETRICS 275, 303 (2000) (finding a great deal of heterogeneity in the
mortgage markets, making default predictions difficult. They do suggest,
however, that homeowners with initial high loan to value loans are less likely
to both default and pay off the loan early.); Christopher L. Foote, Kristopher
Gerardi, & Paul S. Willen, Negative Equity and Foreclosure: Theory and
Evidence, 64 J. URB. ECON 234, 270 (2008) (concluding, in a study of
Massachusetts homeowners, that most people with negative equity do not
default); Andra C. Ghent & Marianna Kudlyak, Recourse and Residential
Mortgage Default: Evidence from US States, 24 REV. FIN. STUD. 3139 (2011)
(finding that strategic defaults are higher for homeowners with more expensive
homes in states where banks have no recourse); Patrick Bajari, Sean Chu, &
Minjung Park, An Empirical Model of Subprime Mortgage Default from 20002007, (NBER Working Paper Series: Working Paper 14625, Dec. 2008),
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w14625 (finding securitization and
pricing the reason for defaults).
6
MICHAEL J. SEILER, ANDREW J. COLLINS, & NINA H. FEFFERMAN,
RES. INST. FOR HOUSING AM., STRATEGIC DEFAULT IN THE CONTEXT OF A
SOCIAL NETWORK: AN EPIDEMIOLOGICAL APPROACH 16 (Oct. 2011), available
at
http://www.housingamerica.org/RIHA/RIHA/Publications/78456_10923_Rese
arch_RIHA_Default_Report.pdf.
7
See generally Bhutta, supra note 5, at 29(estimating that one in five
mortgage defaults in the sample were strategic); Ghent, supra note 5, at 3177
(finding that borrowers with property values over $200,000 at originations, in
non-recourse state increases the possibility of strategic default); Deng, supra
note 5, at 303 (concluding that the heterogeneity of mortgage borrowers cause
variations in default behavior); Foote, supra note 5, at 245 (unable to verify
5
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most we can say is there is some evidence to suggest strategic
defaults are higher for well-to-do homeowners with expensive
homes located in states where lenders cannot obtain deficiency
judgments after default. 8 Despite this, the financial industry has
spent much time and effort creating models to predict strategic
default 9 instead of working to mitigate the losses in foreclosure. 10
In response, and in light of widespread reports of lender abuse,
some commentators have actually begun to advocate strategic
default as a smart economic strategy. 11 Thus, it is unlikely that

that negative equity alone causes strategic defaults).
8
Ghent, supra note 5, at 3177. A deficiency judgment is an amount still
owed to the lender at the end of the foreclosure process. For a more detailed
discussion of deficiency judgments, see discussion infra Part III.
9
See generally Experian-Oliver Wyman Market Intelligence Report:
Understanding
Strategic
default
in
mortgages,
part
one.,
www.marketintlligencereports.com;
Experian-Oliver
Wyman
Market
Intelligence Report: Understanding strategic default in mortgages: Q2 2010
update, available at www.marketintlligencereports.com; Yuliya Demyankyk,
RALPH S.J. KOIJEN, & OTTA A.C. VAN HEMERT, FED. RESERVE BANK OF
CLEVELAND, DETERMINANTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF MORTGAGE
DEFAULT,
available
at
http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/seminars/2010/demyanyk.pdf?WT.oss=
determinants%20and%20consequences&WT.oss_r=392.
10
Patricia A. McCoy, Barriers to Foreclosure Prevention During the
Financial Crisis, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 3, 10 (forthcoming 2013), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2254662. See generally
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-93, MORTGAGE SERVICER
ACTIONS COULD HELP REDUCE THE FREQUENCY AND IMPACT OF
ABANDONED FORECLOSURES (2010) [hereinafter GAO-11-93]; Kristin M.
Pinkston, In the Weeds: Homeowners Falling Behind on their Mortgages,
Lenders Playing the Foreclosure Game, and Cities Left Playing the Price, 34 S.
ILL U. L. J. 621 (2010).
11
See generally Roger Lowenstein, Just Walk Away: Why should
underwater homeowners behave any differently than banks?, N.Y. TIMES
MAG., Jan. 7, 2010, at 15; Chris Taylor, What Happens when you Walk Away
from
your
Home,
REUTERS
(Jan.
27,
2012,
2:52
PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/27/us-housing-strategicdefaultidUSTRE80Q1XX20120127; Brad Tuttle, Strategic Mortgage Default: The
Irresponsible, Amoral, but best Strategy?, TIME (Jan. 11, 2010),
http://business.time.com/2010/01/11/strategic-mortgage-default-theirresponsible-amoral-but-best-strategy/print/; Mandi Woodruff, How to
Strategically Default on Your Home and Live Scott-Free for Years, BUS.
INSIDER
(Dec.
30,
2011,
10:50
AM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/strategically-default-on-your-home-live-free2011-12?op=1.
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the rise in foreclosed and abandoned properties 12 was caused by
strategic defaults. 13 Instead, the cause may be a systematic
abandonment of low and moderate income neighborhoods by the
housing industry. 14
Whether strategic or not, mortgage defaults increased
steadily from 2006 through 2011. 15 In some situations, lenders
moved swiftly after default to foreclose the property; but for other
homeowners the foreclosure process began and then stalled or
was completely abandoned by the lender.16 The result of these
See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-34,
VACANT PROPERTIES: GROWING NUMBER INCREASES COMMUNITIES’ COSTS
AND CHALLENGES (2011); Thomas J. Billitteri, Blighted Cities: Is Demolishing
parts of cities the way to save them?, 20 CQ RESEARCHER 941 (Nov. 12, 2010);
CITY OF SOUTH BEND VACANT AND ABANDONED PROPERTIES TASK FORCE,
VACANT AND ABANDONED PROPERTIES TASK FORCE REPORT, (Feb. 2013),
available
at
http://southbendin.gov/sites/default/files/files/Code_FinalVATF_Report_2_red
.pdf.
13
Michael Hiltzik, Inflated threat of strategic default, L.A. TIMES (Feb.
26,
2012),
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/feb/24/business/la-fi-hiltzik20120224; Richard DeKaser, ‘Strategic Defaults” less Common than Thought,
WASH. POST (Aug. 7, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/08/05/AR2010080507381.html.
14
GAO-11-93, supra note 10, at 14. See generally GEOFF SMITH & SARAH
DUDA, WOODSTOCK INSTITUTE, LEFT BEHIND: TROUBLED FORECLOSED
PROPERTIES AND SERVICER ACCOUNTABILITY IN CHICAGO 6 (Jan. 2011),
available
at
http://www.woodstockinst.org/sites/default/files/attachments/leftbehind_jan20
11_smithduda_0.pdf (relating vacancies concentrated in minority
neighborhoods to abandoned foreclosure); Janet L. Yellen, Vice Chair of Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Remarks at the 2011 Federal
Reserve Bank of Cleveland Policy Summit, Housing Market Developments
and Their Effects on Low-and Moderate Income Neighborhoods (June 9, 2011),
available
at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20110609a.pdf;
JUDITH FOX, RICHARD WILLIAMS & BRIAN MILLER, FORECLOSURES IN ST.
JOSEPH COUNTY, INDIANA FROM 2001-2007 (2008) (on file with author)
(finding a correlation between living in a minority neighborhood and
foreclosure).
15
Commission Report, supra note 2, at 214-21 (describing the increase in
mortgage deficiency by type of loan and region of the county); Shane M.
Sherlund,
Mortgage
Defaults
(Mar.
8,
2010),
available
at
http://www.chicagofed.org/digital_assets/others/region/foreclosure_resource_ce
nter/more_mortgage_defaults.pdf (showing an increase in mortgage defaults
beginning in 2006, but real acceleration in 2009).
16
Linda Allen, Stavros Peristiani, & Yi Tang, Bank Delays in the
Resolution of Delinquent Mortgages: the Problem of Limbo Loans (Fordham
12

Fox Article - Final.docx (Do Not Delete)

30

Loyola Consumer Law Review

11/20/2013 4:10 PM

Vol. 26:1

abandoned foreclosures has been devastating to cities and
consumers throughout the country. 17 This article explores what is
happening to homeowners caught up in the strange world of
bank walkaways as the economy is beginning to improve. This
second wave of collection activity, an echo of the original
foreclosure crisis, could easily throw thousands of consumers
back into financial hardship just as the economic recovery begins.
Part I of this article explores the evidence of foreclosures
started and then stalled or abandoned and their impact on
consumers and communities. In Part II “the real zombie title” is
introduced through evidence gathered in foreclosures in Indiana.
This new form of “zombie loan” is a mortgage loan that has been
foreclosed, but is suddenly and inexplicably “un-foreclosed.” The
effect of zombie loans on homeowner, judicial system and
communities is also explored. Finally, Part III discusses the
increased presence of debt buyers in both the buying of loans and
the collection of deficiency judgment in relation to the overall
University Schools of Business Research Paper No. 2018948), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2018948 (finding 21.79%
of the loans in their sample of Florida foreclosures to be limbo loans); Linda E.
Fisher, Shadowed by the Shadow Inventory: A Newark, New Jersey Case
Study of Stalled Foreclosures and Their Consequences, 3 U.C. Irvine L. Rev.
(forthcoming 2013) (finding that 37% of the cases in her study were in legal
limbo); MICHAEL SCHRAMM, APRIL HIRSH, DIWAKAR VANAPALLI, DANIEL J.
VAN GROL, KRISTA MOINE NELSON, & CLAUDIA COLTON, CENTER ON
URBAN POVERTY AND CMTY. DEV., MANDEL SCH. OF APPLIED SOC.
SCIENCES, STALLING THE FORECLOSURE PROCESS: THE COMPLEXITY
BEHIND
BANK
WALKAWAYS
(Feb.
2011),
available
at
http://blog.case.edu/msass/2011/02/07/CUPCD_2011_02_07_Stalling%20the%
20foreclosure%20process%20the%20complexity%20behind%20bank%20walkaway.pdf
(examining
bank walkaways in Cleveland and finding that in 17% of their sample the
bank had affirmatively walked away and in another 39% there was an
unexplained delay by the bank in the foreclosure); KATIE BUITRAGO,
WOODSTOCK INSTITUTE, DECIPHERING BLIGHT: VACANT BUILDINGS DATA
COLLECTION IN THE CHICAGO SIX COUNTY REGION 3 (June 2013)
[hereinafter
DECIPHERING
BLIGHT],
available
at
http://www.woodstockinst.org/sites/default/files/attachments/decipheringblight
_buitrago_june2013.pdf (“the phenomenon of foreclosures that are initiated
but not pursued to auction increased the likelihood that the properties become
vacant”).
17
See generally Pinkston, supra note 10. These calls to default are often
connected to reports of lender misbehavior, including the evidence that banks
make similar decisions about walking away from properties that are too far
underwater to be worth foreclosing. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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concern currently being voiced regarding the debt buying
industry. The clever ways banks are managing their foreclosure
inventory make clear that the effects of zombie loans must be
mitigated in order to avoid a second economic downturn, the
“foreclosure echo.”

II. ABANDONED FORCLOSURES
Abandoned foreclosure, bank walkaway, “zombie title,”
and “limbo loan” are all terms used to describe a situation where
a homeowner is in default, but the foreclosure does not proceed in
the normal fashion to the eventual sale of the. 18 The phenomenon
first surfaced in Midwestern rust belt states. 19 Congress, at the
urging of Ohio representatives, called for an investigation into the
relationship between vacant properties and abandoned
foreclosures. The General Accounting Office commenced a study
that was released in November 2011. 20 The study was limited in
that it only examined loans owned by the large servicers and
government sponsored entities. 21 It concluded that most servicers
do an equity analysis before determining whether to initiate a
foreclosure. 22 When it is not economically beneficial to foreclose,
the lender charges-off 23 the loan without initiating a foreclosure. 24
Different authors and commentators are using different terminology for
the same actions. See GAO-11-93, supra note 10 (“abandoned foreclosure”);
Allen et al., supra note 16 (limbo loans); SCHRAMM ET AL., supra note 16 (using
the terminology “walkaway”); Michelle Conlin, Special Report: The latest
foreclosure horror: the zombie title, REUTERS (Jan. 10, 2013, 1:58 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/10/us-usa-foreclosures-zombiesidUSBRE9090G920130110 (coined the term “zombie title”).
19
Susan Saulny, Banks Starting to Walk Away on Foreclosure, N.Y.
TIMES,
Mar.
30,
2009,
at
A20,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/30/us/30walkaway.html?pagewanted=print;
Sandra Livingston, Bank ‘walkaways’ from foreclosed homes a growing,
troubling trend, THE PLAIN DEALER (last updated July 19, 2009, 6:33 PM),
http://blog.cleveland.com/metro//print.html?entry=/2009/07/bank_walkaways_
from_foreclosed.html; Mary Ellen Podmolik, More banks walking away from
homes, adding to the housing crisis, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 13, 2011),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-01-13/news/ct-biz-0113-walkaway—
20110113_1_foreclosure-process-foreclosure-filing-servicers.
20
GAO-11-93, supra note 10.
21
Id. at 14.
22
Id. at 15.
23
The accounting term “charge-off” means the company writes off the
loan as uncollectable. This allows the bank to take a tax deduction for the loss.
18

Fox Article - Final.docx (Do Not Delete)

32

Loyola Consumer Law Review

11/20/2013 4:10 PM

Vol. 26:1

Some lenders reported initiating a foreclosure, but abandoning it
before the property was brought to final foreclosure sale. 25 As
illustrated in the GAO chart reproduced below, properties
evaluated in the study were significantly more likely to be
abandoned by the homeowner if the loan was charged-off after
the foreclosure was initiated than if the charge-off occurred
before the foreclosure process began. 26

27

While the number of abandoned homes related to
abandoned foreclosures in this study was small as a percentage of
all foreclosures, they were concentrated in certain areas, thus
becoming a disproportionate problem for those communities. 28 Of
those identified communities, most were located in the Midwest. 29
Since then, individual studies have documented the problem in
Chicago, Illinois; Cleveland, Ohio; Newark, New Jersey; and the
state of Florida. 30
The lender can continue with collection efforts or sell the loan.
24
GAO-11-93, supra note 10, at 15.
25
Id. at 16.
26
Id. at 17.
27
Id.
28
Id. at 16.
29
Detroit, Chicago, Cleveland and Indianapolis had the largest numbers
of abandoned homes due to abandoned foreclosures. Of the top twenty,
thirteen were in the Midwest. South Bend and Mishawaka, Indiana, though
not listed in the top cities, were identified as communities where the overall
number was too small to put them in the top twenty, but whose numbers of
abandoned properties as a result of abandoned foreclosure were significant
relative to the size of the community. Id. at 22.
30
See Allen et al., supra note 16; Fisher, supra note 16; SCHRAMM ET AL.,
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There can be significantly different legal consequences to
homeowners depending on when in the default process the
foreclosure is abandoned or what state the homeowner lives in.
The case-specific information contained in this paper is from
Indiana, a judicial foreclosure state. 31 Some of the negative
consequences to be discussed in this paper are only relevant to
homeowners who live in a judicial foreclosure state. Others will
only affect you if your state allows deficiency judgments. For
some, your location does not matter. Thus far, all of the available
studies have been conducted in judicial foreclosure states. This
may be because the judicial process lends itself to inquiry. You
can measure how many cases are filed and how many are
followed through to completion. No such records exist in nonjudicial foreclosure states. It may also be that the very definition
of an abandoned foreclosure requires there to be some kind of
“process” that was started and never finished. However, there are
also homeowners in default, but for whom no foreclosure has
occurred in non-judicial foreclosure states; 32 however, it is harder
to document those cases.
Because all the available studies of abandoned
foreclosures are from judicial states, the focus of this discussion
will be about the implications of these cases in judicial
foreclosure settings. The specific procedures for judicial
foreclosure vary from state-to-state, but as a general rule, once
the homeowner defaults, the lender files a court action, obtains a
foreclosure judgment, and then sells the property to satisfy that
supra note 16; DECIPHERING BLIGHT, supra note 16.
31
There are twenty states in which judicial foreclosure is the usual
method of foreclosure: Connecticut (strict foreclosure), Delaware, Florida,
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, New Jersey
(residential properties only), New York, New Mexico (recently amended to
allow non-judicial foreclosure in loans after 2006), North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Vermont, and Wisconsin. JOHN
RAO ET. AL., NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER FORECLOSURES:
MORTGAGE SERVICING, MORTGAGE MODIFICATIONS, AND FORECLOSURE
DEFENSE, App. E, 845-67. (National Consumer Law Center 4th ed. 2012)
[hereinafter Foreclosure Defense].
32
Realty Trac tracks foreclosure filings nationally. They report that the
pre-foreclosure inventor rose 59% in the first quarter of 2013. The rise was not
exclusive to judicial states, suggesting that the stalled foreclosure is not
exclusively a judicial state phenomenon. REALTY TRAC, EXCLUSIVE REPORT:
Q1 2013 FORECLOSURE INVENTORY UPDATE 1, 3 (2013), available at
http://www.realtytrac.com/images/reportimages/RealtyTrac_Foreclosure_Inve
ntory_Analysis_Q1_2013.pdf.
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judgment. 33 If there is no buyer at the sale, the bank will often repurchase the asset. 34 Evidence that a foreclosure can be
abandoned at any stage of the process is provided by a review of
Irwin Mortgage’s foreclosure filings in the doxpop electronic
filing system from 2006 and 2007. 35 Of the 157 foreclosures filed
by Irwin Mortgage during this period, nearly one third could be
categorized as abandoned foreclosures. Twenty-nine were filed
and dismissed. Nine cases went to judgment, but the foreclosure
sale never occurred. In another nineteen cases, judgment was
entered and then vacated by the bank. The Governmental
Accounting Office’s research concluded that most loans are
charged-off before foreclosure is initiated. 36 The situation that has
created the most controversy, however, is when the foreclosure
action is filed, but abandoned before a foreclosure judgment is
entered. 37
A. Foreclosure Filed and Then Dismissed
It is difficult to calculate the number of borrowers whose
loans have simply been charged-off by the bank prior to initiating
foreclosure; evidence from the six largest servicers prior to 2010
documents the number at fewer than 20,000. 38 Subsequent
studies 39 and anecdotal evidence 40 suggest the phenomenon is far
Id.
The failure of banks to maintain these properties is another serious,
related problem. A growing body of evidence suggests that even if they do not
walk away from the foreclosure, lenders are walking away from the property.
See generally, NATIONAL FAIR HOUSING ALLIANCE, THE BANKS ARE BACK—
OUR NEIGHBORHOODS ARE NOT: DISCRIMINATION IN THE MAINTENANCE
AND MARKETING OF REO PROPERTIES (2012) [hereinafter BANKS ARE BACK],
available
at
http://www.nationalfairhousing,org/Portals/33/the_banks_are_back_web.pdf
(examining the condition of bank owned properties in seven different
communities across the country and finding significant disparities in how the
banks maintained properties in majority white as opposed to minority
neighborhoods).
35
Doxpop is an electronic database of court filings available at
www.doxpop.com. Docket sheets are available for 82 counties in Indiana.
Copies of the case docket are available, though copies of individual filings are
not.
36
GAO-11-93, supra note 10, at 16.
37
Conlin, supra note 18.
38
GAO-11-93, supra note 10, at 17.
39
Allen et al., supra note 16, at 16 (concluding that 1/5 of all Florida’s
33
34
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more pervasive. A foreclosure that is never filed, or one that is
filed and later dismissed, is a mixed bag for consumers, but it is a
better situation for neighbors. The GAO study found that 70% of
homeowners remain in their homes if the loan is charged off and
foreclosure never initiated. 41
If foreclosure is initiated, and then dismissed, the numbers
drop to only 52%, though still more homeowners remain in their
homes than abandon them. 42 Take, for example, the story of
Melissa Jones. 43 Ms. Jones and her husband had a stable financial
life until Mr. Jones became ill. As his situation deteriorated,
Melissa found herself unable to work full time because of the
need to be at home to care for her dying husband. When he
finally passed away, the decline in her own income coupled with
the loss of his disability income drove her into foreclosure. The
bank filed a foreclosure action. This foreclosure was initiated
early in the foreclosure crisis before any viable programs for loan
modification were available for homeowners. 44 When the
subprime mortgages originated between 2004 and 2008 are at some point
“limbo loans.); Fisher, supra note 16 (finding that 37% of the cases in her study
in Newark, New Jersey were in legal limbo); SCHRAMM ET AL., supra note 16
(examining bank walkaways in Cleveland and finding that in 17% of their
sample the bank had affirmatively walked away and in another 39% there was
an unexplained delay by the bank in the foreclosure); DECIPHERING BLIGHT,
supra note 16 (finding that abandoned foreclosure increased the likelihood of a
property being vacant in Chicago).
40
For examples of homeowners caught up in abandoned foreclosures, see
Conlin, supra note 18; Susan Saulny, When Living In Limbo Avoids Living On
the Street, N.Y. TIMES, March 4, 2012, at A14.
41
GAO-11-93, supra note 10, at 17. The study found that in 70% of the
cases they looked at where foreclosure had not been initiated, the homeowner
was still in the home.
42
Id.
43
Not her real name. The circumstances of this story and other client
stories contained in this article are factual. Unless previously released to the
press, I have changed the client’s name and inconsequential details to preserve
the homeowner’s privacy. All parties consented to their stories appearing in
this article.
44
The Hope for Homeowners program was initiated in 2008. It was a
voluntary program and widely considered a failure. In the first seven months
of the program only one borrower in the entire country had obtained a
refinance. McCoy, supra note 10, at 10. The Obama administration made
changes that did allow more homeowners to be assisted, but many still feel not
enough is being done to assist homeowners. See generally Alan M. White,
Rewriting Contracts, Wholesale: Data on Voluntary Mortgage Modifications
from 2007 and 2008 Remittance Reports, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 509 (2009);
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students at Notre Dame’s Economic Justice Project 45 examined
the paperwork for the loan foreclosure, they became suspicious.
After some investigation and diligent searching, the students
located the bank employee who had allegedly signed the
documents. More accurately, they found the woman whose name
appeared on the paperwork. She had not, in fact, signed them.
Instead, someone else had signed her name and she signed an
affidavit for the Economic Justice Project attesting to the
forgery. 46 When these errors were brought to the bank’s attention,
they dismissed the foreclosure, with prejudice. 47
In a study of Florida foreclosures, Allen, Peristianui and
Tang, tested whether lost or missing documentation could
account for the abandoned foreclosures they discovered in their
Florida study.48
They dubbed this the “operational risk
hypothesis.” 49 They found that the “greater incidence of
foreclosure case dismissals (resulting from legal and operational
Lynnley Browning, Distressed Owners Are Frustrated by Aid Group, N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
2,
2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/02/business/02hope.html?_r=0;
Dawn
Kopecki & Theo Francis, U.S. May Retool Program for Underwater Borrowers
(Update
1),
BLOOMBERG
(Jan.
27,
2010,
9:56
AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aXET2r166YG
U.
45
The Economic Justice Program is the consumer clinic the author
supervises as part of the Notre Dame Law School’s Clinical Law Center.
Students, usually in their final year of law school, represent low and moderateincome clients against foreclosure and related debt collection.
46
These documents are on file with the author. This occurred years before
the robo-signing scandal became news. At the time, no one had heard of robosigning. Now we know that such occurrences were common in the industry.
See generally DAVID H. CARPENTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 41491,
“ROBO-SIGNING” AND OTHER ALLEGED DOCUMENTATION PROBLEMS IN
JUDICIAL AND NONJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE PROCESSES 14 (2010) [hereinafter
ROBO-SIGNING].
47
A dismissal with prejudice would mean the lender cannot re-initiate the
foreclosure filing. However, the Indiana Court of Appeals, in Afolabi v. Atl.
Mort. & Inv. Corp., had found there is neither res judicata or claim preclusion
prevented the lender from initiating foreclosure after a previous foreclosure
had been lost in summary judgment. Afolabi v. Atl. Mort. & Inv. Corp, 849
N.E.2d 1170, 1173 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). Each missed payment triggers a new
default and a new right to foreclose. Id. While the facts in Ms. Jones’s case are
distinguishable, it was not entirely clear that the bank could not re-file the
foreclosure.
48
Allen et al., supra note 16, at 5.
49
Id. at 17.
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problems) is associated with a greater likelihood that a loan
remains in limbo.” 50 Similarly, the Governmental Accounting
Office found that “[t]he vast majority of abandoned foreclosures
were loans that involved third-party investors including those
that were securitized into private label [mortgaged-backed
securities].” 51
Interestingly, the evidence from Florida also found that
“the presence of MERS 52 makes a delinquent loan more likely to
end up in limbo.” 53 Melissa’s loan was a MERS loan as well. The
theory behind the MERS system is that MERS acts as the
registered mortgage holder, allowing the mortgage to be sold
while MERS maintains records of the equitable owner. 54
Unfortunately, the theory failed to translate well into practice and
research shows that MERS has not operated as intended..55 In
theory, one of two things should have occurred. Either the
originating lender should have prepared “a blank mortgage
assignment to be filled in later in the event that recording the
assignment became necessary for foreclosure purposes” 56 or
MERS should have recorded the mortgage in its name as
“nominee” and then kept track of the beneficial owner. 57
However, Professor White presents a third option, which was to
“take neither step, so that when foreclosure becomes necessary,
the servicer is forced to obtain an assignment (or perhaps
fabricate one) from the original lender to the current owner.” 58
50
Id. at 28 (finding that “one-standard-deviation increase (14.2%) in
dismissals is associated with a 9.4% increase in the probability that the loan
remains in limbo.”)
51
GAO-11-93, supra note 10, at 28.
52
MERS is the Mortgage Electronic Registry System. It was created to
allow for the easy buying and selling of loans by “eliminating the need to
record each mortgage assignment in county property records.” Alan M. White,
Losing the Paper-Mortgage Assignments, Note Transfers and Consumer
Protection, 24 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 468, 486 (2012); See generally
Commission Report, supra note 2, at 407 (explaining how standing problems
with MERS exacerbated the foreclosure problems); Christopher L. Peterson,
Two Faces: Demystifying the Mortgage Electronic Registration System’s Land
Title Theory, 53 WM & MARY L. REV. 111 (2011) (describing MERS and its
purpose, creation, and the problems it created in the land recording system).
53
Allen et al., supra note 16, at 28.
54
White, supra note 52, at 486.
55
Id. at 485-88.
56
Id. at 485.
57
Id.
58
Id.
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This is exactly what happened in Melissa’s case. When the
lender wanted to foreclose, the servicer did not have the
paperwork. The original lender had been out of business for
several years. An assignment was fabricated, ultimately resulting
in the foreclosure being dismissed. Considering the many
paperwork problems discovered in relation to securitized loans, 59
it is not surprising that these loans would be disproportionately
abandoned.
Dismissal in a mortgage foreclosure may seem like a good
result for a homeowner, but in many ways it is not. After the
dismissal, Melissa was in legal limbo. She made multiple attempts
to contact the bank to negotiate ways to pay back the loan, but
the bank had charged-off the loan so they would not discuss
repayment with her. She did not have a clear title to facilitate a
sale. The Economic Justice Project filed a quiet title action and
was able to permanently remove the mortgage lien from her
property. Removing the mortgage, however, does not solve the
entire limbo loan problem. The original note, if it exists, can still
be enforced against the homeowner. 60 Indiana follows the
common law rule that the mortgage follows the note. 61 Granted,
the mortgage was extinguished in the quiet title action, but this is
such an unusual situation that it is hard to predict what a court
might do with these facts. If the note ever re-appears, Melissa will
owe a huge debt that she cannot possibly pay off.
A pro se petitioner will likely have trouble succeeding on,
let alone filing, a quiet title action. Most consumers in foreclosure
are unrepresented 62 and, therefore, will be unable to remove the
59
See generally White, supra note 522 (describing many of the paperwork
problems that appeared during the foreclosure crisis); ROBO-SIGNING, supra
note 466, at 9 (describing how robo-signing and other issues manifest
themselves in judicial foreclosure states).
60
IND. CODE ANN. § 26-1-3.1-301 (West 2013). See also Douglas J.
Whaley, Mortgage Foreclosure, Promissory notes, and the Uniform
Commercial Code, 39 W. ST. U. L. REV. 313, 320–23 (2012) (explaining the
general relationship between the note, the mortgage, and the Uniform
Commercial Code in foreclosure); Elizabeth Renuart, Uneasy Intersections:
The Right to Foreclose and the UCC, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 5
(forthcoming, 2013) (explaining extensively the relationship between the UCC
and foreclose in the context of different state jurisprudence).
61
This was codified in the IND. CODE ANN. § 26-1-9.1-203(g) (West 2013).
See generally Whaley, supra note 60, at 320–23 (explaining the merger doctrine
and the common law rule the “the mortgage follows the note”).
62
MELANCA CLARK & MAGGIE BARRON, BRENNAN CENTER FOR
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mortgage lien from their home. If these homeowners need to
move for business or personal reasons, their only option is to
abandon the home.
B. Foreclosure Filed, Then Stalled
Another category of borrowers are those for whom home
foreclosure was filed in court, but not prosecuted to completion.
These might best be called “stalled,” as opposed to abandoned,
foreclosures. Some of these foreclosures are stalled because the
lender cannot locate the proper paperwork,63 while others are in
the endless loop that has become loss mitigation, 64 and an
undetermined number are bundled into new securities and sold
back into the secondary market, often along with performing
mortgages. 65 Some lenders may simply be waiting for the
economy to improve before proceeding. This is what happened to
Nick, another client of the Economic Justice Project.
Nick was sued for foreclosure in May 2010. 66 At the time
he was unemployed and did not qualify for a loan modification.
He resigned himself to losing the house and put it up for sale. He
was unable to find a buyer. He tried unsuccessfully to contact the
bank. Nearly three years passed and then, unexpectedly, the bank
asked the court to enter a foreclosure judgment. A new servicer
was involved.67 Nick is now working and can afford to make
payments. He is attempting to work with the bank to retain the
home. This case is likely to have a happy ending; or is it?
A stalled foreclosure case raises a number of problems for

JUSTICE, FORECLOSURES: A CRISIS IN LEGAL REPRESENTATION 2 (2009)
(documenting the lack of legal representation in foreclosure cases and the
negative ramifications for homeowners).
63
David Streitfeld, Foreclosures Slow as Document Flaws Emerge, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 1, 2010, at A1.
64
See generally Commission Report, supra note 2, at 405; McCoy, supra
note 10, at 47.
65
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, THE STRUCTURE AND PRACTICES OF
THE DEBT BUYING INDUSTRY T-5 (Jan, 2013).
66
Cause No. 71-D07-1005-MF-00411, St. Joseph Superior Court.
67
The loan may also have a new owner, which would explain some of the
long delay. The homeowner never really knows who “owns” the loan. They
only know who is servicing the loan. This is a frustration for the homeowner
and complicates workout options. Servicers claim restrictions to modification
that may or may not be true and most homeowners have no way to verify the
claims.
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the homeowner. Three years of interest and fees can substantially
increase the balance due on a mortgage. 68 It exacerbates the
problem many homeowners already experience: that they owe
more on the home than the home is worth. Faced with this
dilemma, some may choose to walk away from the property. 69
The buying and selling of these distressed mortgage assets
has become big business, again suggesting the number of these
nonperforming loans is not small. 70 Some of these buyers are
willing to work with homeowners; others are looking to foreclose
and flip the property. 71 It is hard to know which is more
Some have argued that this is a deliberate attempt to increase fees for
the servicers. See McCoy, supra note 10, at 41–44 (for an explanation of the fee
structure associated with mortgage servicing).
69
And now we have come full circle. Those who may not have
strategically defaulted, strategically choose to give up attempts to save the
home when faced with the growing balance due. The industry has doggedly
resisted any principal write downs to save homes from foreclosure, even when
the “principal” is really capitalized interest and fees.
70
John Collins Rudolf, Auctions for Troubled Property Loans Jump to the
Web, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2009, at B1; Janet Morrissey, New REITs Pounce
on
Distressed
Mortgage
Assets,
TIME
(Aug.
18,
2009),
http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,1916998,00.html#; Carolyn Said,
Vulture investors buy up distressed mortgages, S.F. CHRON. (June 7, 2010, 4:00
AM),
http://www.sfgate.com/business/article/Vulture-investors-buy-updistressed-mortgages-3262447.php.
71
HUD, when announcing its Distressed Asset Stabilization Program,
highlights the fact that purchasers will be able to modify loans and still make
money because of the low cost of the loan. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN
DEV. HUD NO. 12-116, HUD ACCEPTING APPLICATIONS FOR ENTITIES TO
PURCHASE TROUBLED MORTGAGES, OFFER CHANCE TO AVOID COSTLY
FORECLOSURES AND STABILIZE NEIGHBORHOODS (July 18, 2012) [hereinafter
HUD
No.
12-116],
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/press/press_releases_media_adviso
ries/2012/HUDNo.12-116. But see NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER,
FHA’S DISTRESSED ASSET SALES AND LOSS MITIGATION SHOULD BE
REFORMED TO MAXIMIZE SUSTAINABLE HOMEOWNERSHIP SOLUTIONS (Aug.
31,
2012)
[hereinafter
FHA
REFORM],
available
at
http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/foreclosure_mortgage/mortgage_servicing/fha
hud-%20asset-sales%20issue-brief31aug2012.pdf (calling on HUD to require
investors who purchase the loans to comply with HUD loss mitigation rules);
NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, FHA’S DISTRESSED ASSET SALE
PROGRAM SHOULD STRENGTHEN HOME RETENTION GOALS (Dec. 26, 2012)
[hereinafter
HOME
RETENTION
GOALS],
available
at
https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/foreclosure_mortgage/mortgage_servicing/fha
-loan-sales-12262012.pdf (recommending changes in the distressed asset sale
that provide more accountability and transparency).
68
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beneficial to the economy; occupied homes are usually better than
vacant properties, but homeowners whose loans are sold to
investors can be left in uncertain and often expensive situations.
C. Foreclosure Abandoned After Judgment, Pre-sale
Troubling stories have surfaced concerning homes that
were foreclosed, but never sold to satisfy the judgment. 72 Mercy is
one such mortgage holder. 73 In 2007, the Economic Justice
Project represented almost exclusively mortgage defense clients.
Mercy came in for assistance with a property issue that did not
seem to fit the typical foreclosure profile. The Project’s student
intern and I almost turned her away. Had we done so, I would
not be writing this article. Mercy’s case first made me aware of
the devastating effects of bank walkaways.
Mercy was a recent immigrant, unsophisticated in
American real estate practice. A local real estate investor
convinced her that the way to succeed in America was through
land speculation. She and several other recent immigrants were
persuaded to purchase several rental properties. 74 In one day,
through one closing, Mercy signed closing documents for ten
loans, several with the same bank. All the properties were rental
properties, allegedly occupied with tenants. As it turned out, none
of the properties had tenants and most were not habitable. The
loan documents she signed accurately reflected her poverty-level
income and lack of knowledge in real estate management.
However, she never saw the documents submitted to the banks.

72
See Conlin, supra note 18 (describing what she dubs the “zombie title”
as a situation where the homeowner thinks his or her home was lost in
foreclosure, only to discover the bank never took title and there are thousands
of dollars of fees owed to local governments); Podmolik, supra note 19
(discussing the problems loan walkaways are creating for municipalities);
Saulny, supra note 19 (explaining the story of loans abandoned after
judgment).
73
See Saulny, supra note 19 (featuring Mercy in one of the early stories of
bank walkaways).
74
The perpetrators of this fraud were eventually convicted in federal
court in three separate cases for their role in the scheme. United States v.
Sheneman, No. 3:10-CR-00120 (01), WL 2906859 (N.D. Ind. July 16, 2012). See
also Mary Kate Malone, Elder Sheneman gets eight years in South Bend
mortgage fraud scheme, SOUTH BEND TRIB. (Sept. 14, 2011),
http://articles.southbendtribune.com/2011-09-14/news/30158261_1_superiormortgage-lending-tri-state-mortgage-mortgage-fraud-scheme.
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Unsurprising, all the properties fell into foreclosure almost
immediately. 75
Interestingly, it was not one of these foreclosures that
brought Mercy to my office, but a notice from the City of South
Bend informing her that one of her properties was in violation of
city building codes. Mercy was confused. Two years earlier, she
had appeared in St. Joseph Superior Court and agreed to the
foreclosure and sale of this property. 76 When Mercy came to my
office, she brought a copy of the notice for sheriff’s sale. She had
abandoned the property prior to the June 2007 sale date, and had
not visited the property since. We were sure there had been a
mistake and contacted the city to explain that Mercy no longer
owned the property. We were wrong. The bank had filed the
foreclosure. Mercy had, in fact, appeared in court and agreed to
the entry of a judgment. The judgment had been entered, just as
she remembered. The bank had requested a sheriff sale and a
date had been set. Notice of that sale was sent to Mercy, as
required by Indiana law. 77 What Mercy did not know was that
the sale never occurred. The bank cancelled it, presumably
because it determined that the home was not worth selling. Mercy
did not receive notice that the sale had been cancelled because no
such notice is required by Indiana law. The property remained in
Mercy’s name; therefore, she remained legally responsible for the
maintenance. 78 Unfortunately for Mercy, the city and her former
neighbors, she had no knowledge of this obligation. The property
had been uninhabited for a year and in that time vandals had
stolen nearly everything of value, including the copper pipes and
appliances. Eventually, the property was demolished.
75
Cause No. 71-CO1-0605-MF-00430; 71-C01-0605-MF-00441; 71-CO10605-MF-00440; 71-DO1-0606-MF-00611; 71-CO1-0606-MF-00497 ; 71-DO70606-MF-00557; 71CO1-0606-MF-00483; 71DO5-0807-MF-00723; 71DO60605-MF-00484. The mortgage on the tenth property has not been paid in
many years, though no foreclosure has been filed. The property is not
habitable.
76
Judgment was entered on 7/10/2006. The sale was set for 6/21/2007. 71D07-0696-MF-00557.
77
IND. CODE ANN. § 32-29-7-3(c) (West 2013).
78
Under Indiana law, the home remains in the name of the homeowner
until sheriff’s sale. The foreclosure judgment allows the bank to petition for
the sale, but it does not divest the homeowner of ownership of the property.
IND. CODE ANN. § 32-29-7-11 (West 2013). In normal times, this was a good
thing. In the era of abandoned foreclosures, it has become a nightmare for
many homeowners.
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Mercy’s story is all too common. 79 Through conversations
with the City of South Bend’s code enforcement office, we
discovered that this “happens all the time.” 80 A special report by
Reuters documented homeowners in Columbus, Ohio, Cleveland,
Ohio and Buffalo, New York facing similar circumstances. 81 The
number of cases in front of Cleveland Housing Court Judge
Raymond Pianka involving “derelict properties” has doubled in
recent years, “due largely to homes vacated by people who fled
before an imminent foreclosure sale, only to learn later that they
remain legally responsible for their house.” 82 A Woodstock
Institute study of vacant properties in Chicago found that homes
were more likely to become vacant when foreclosure was
initiated, but not followed through to sale. 83 This situation can
create different problems, depending on the laws in your
particular community. In Cleveland, the homeowner can find
herself facing multiple fines and court costs. In Mercy’s
hometown of South Bend, Indiana, the number of these cases has
doubled since 2006. 84

III. THE REAL “ZOMBIE TITLE”
Michelle Conlin of Reuters coined the term “zombie title”
to explain these uncompleted foreclosures. 85 While the
homeowners she described as having “zombie titles” faced
significant problems, a truer form of “zombie title” has entered
the market—a home that is foreclosed, never set for sale, and
then “un-foreclosed” by the lender. The note and mortgage are
inexplicably re-born.
It is hard to determine how many of these “zombie titles”
are really lurking in the shadows of the mortgage industry.
Foreclosure is a state court process and there is no efficient way
Conlin, supra note 18.
Interviews with Ann Carol Nash and Cathy Toppel, City of South
Bend, March 3, 2009.
81
Conlin, supra note 18.
82
Id.
83
DECIPHERING BLIGHT, supra note 16, at 3.
84
Id.
85
Conlin, supra note 18. “Zombie title” is an obvious reference to the term
“zombie debt”, which has become widely recognized in the debt collection
world as referring to debt that is very old, usually beyond the statute of
limitation or already discharged in bankruptcy that is seemingly re-born by a
debt collector who aggressively works to collect.
79
80

Fox Article - Final.docx (Do Not Delete)

Loyola Consumer Law Review

44

11/20/2013 4:10 PM

Vol. 26:1

to search court filings to determine the number of cases where a
foreclosure judgment was entered and subsequently set aside. 86
Indiana does not have an online filing or records system, although
approximately one half of Indiana’s counties record their docket
sheets in an online docket system, doxpop. 87 A search from
January 1, 2009 to July 1, 2011 revealed hundreds of cases where
the judgment was set aside, but did not reveal much about why
the judgment was set aside. Judge Manier, a St. Joseph County
Superior Judge, reports a recent increase in the number of
requests to set aside foreclosure judgments. 88 In a study of
abandoned foreclosures in Cleveland, researchers categorized
17% of the loans in the sample as loans where the bank had either
set aside a previously awarded judgment or notified the court it
did not want to proceed. 89 In the vast majority of cases, no reason
was given for the motions to vacate or dismiss. 90 In her study of
Newark, New Jersey foreclosures, Linda Fisher also found
evidence of judgments that were being set aside. 91 These
additional findings are consistent with mine. I am, therefore,
confident in stating that banks are going back into foreclosure
cases and setting aside previously entered foreclosure judgments.
I am less confident stating one definitive reason for the
practice. A review of files in St. Joseph, LaPorte, Allen and
Elkhart counties suggests some reasons, but it is impossible to
state one definitive cause for this phenomenon. Lenders tend to
give vague or nonexistent reasons for seeking to vacate a
judgment. 92 A closer examination of some of the files illustrates
State Court Caseload Statistics, COURT STATISTICS PROJECT (last
visited
September
9,
2013),
http://www.courtstatistics.org/OtherPages/stateCourtCaseloadStatistics.aspx.
87
DOXPOP, http://www.doxpop.com/ (last visited September 26, 2013).
88
Hearing Transcript at 12-13, JP Morgan Chase v. Pinckert, No. 71D051208-MF-00529 (St. Joseph Cnty., Ind. Super. Ct. Aug. 27, 2013) [hereinafter
Hearing Transcript].
89
SCHRAMM ET AL., supra note 16, at 7.
90
Id.
91
Fisher, supra note 16, at 37-38.
92
SCHRAMM ET AL., supra note 16, at 7. (In one case the study cites the
lender moved to set aside the judgment because “the parties had resolved the
matter.” When the judge inquired further, the bank admitted that the parties
had not resolved the matter. The low equity in the property was the real
reason for setting aside the judgment.). In my review of files, language
implying the parties had settled was common. In every case that the judge
inquired, it turned out to be untrue. See infra Part II.C.
86
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the difficulty in determining the real motivation behind these
zombie loans.
A. The Doctrine of Merger and its Implication in the Selling of
Distressed Mortgages
Donna had what I would characterize as an abandoned
mortgage, not a “zombie title.” 93 However, her story best explains
how a mortgage loan might move from being simply abandoned
to being re-born as “zombie title.” When Donna came to the
Economic Justice Project for assistance, her home had already
been foreclosed. 94 In the ensuing two years, the house had fallen
into disrepair. Donna had been surprised to receive a complaint
for a second foreclosure proceeding on the same mortgage note.
She did not have a second mortgage, nor did she recognize the
name of the company that was foreclosing. We later determined it
was an investor. The investor claimed it had purchased the note
from the lender. The lender, likewise, appeared and claimed it
had sold the note and mortgage to the investor after entry of the
judgment.
The doctrine of merger makes the lender’s and the
investor’s understanding of the situation legally impossible.
According to this longstanding doctrine, when a judgment is
entered the underlying claim merges into that judgment. 95 In a
foreclosure, the underlying claim would be the note and the
Donna has agreed to let us discuss her situation, but requested to
protect her anonymity. The specifics of this case are not as important as the
legal implications. Therefore, I am not providing the file numbers and parties’
names in order to obscure her identity. The records are public and on file with
the St. Joseph Superior Court.
94
Because of a prior foreclosure, the judgment was “in rem” and did not,
as is customary in Indiana, include a personal judgment on the note.
95
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 18 cmt. a (1982). See In re
Schlect, 36 B.R. 236, 240 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1983) (finding promissory note had
merged into the foreclosure judgment previously entered in state court and,
therefore, the provision in that note that allowed for the payment of attorney’s
fees did not apply in the bankruptcy court); Caine & Weiner v. Barker, 713
P.2d 1133, 1134 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986) (judgment awarded against two signers
of a promissory note; when one paid the debt and then tried to obtain
attorney’s fees provided for in the note from the second debtor, the court found
that the note had merged into the judgment); But see In re Gayle, 189 B.R.
919, 920 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1995) (bank foreclosed in a non-judicial proceeding
and then obtained a separate court judgment on the note; the court held that
the doctrine of merger did not preclude a bank from pursuing the foreclosure).
93
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mortgage, both of which merge into the foreclosure judgment
once it is entered. Simply put, when the lender allegedly sold this
note to an investor, there was no promissory note to sell. There
was only a judgment.
This case eventually came to a satisfactory conclusion as
the bank agreed to assign its judgment to the investor.
Procedurally, this is what the bank should have done if it wanted
to charge-off the loan after the judgment was entered. The
assignment of judgment allowed the investor to proceed with the
sheriff’s sale. The investor ultimately took possession by bidding
the judgment amount at the sale.
This case illustrates several important issues for
discussion. First, it suggests that at least some of the underlying
loans connected to the abandoned foreclosures are being sold on
the secondary market. It also appears these sales may occur
despite the fact that there is no longer a promissory note to sell. 96
Of course, the experience of one homeowner does not prove a
pattern; though it does provide evidence for one. Additional
evidence is found in the fact that throughout the process, the
investor, the mortgage servicer, and their legal representatives
failed to understand the doctrine of merger and the legal
implications of the prior foreclosure judgment. As a result,
judicial resources and attorney time were wasted. This experience
left my students and me with few doubts that this has occurred to
other, unrepresented homeowners and helps to explain why some
lenders may be seeking to vacate judgments, thereby creating a
“zombie title.”
1. Trial Rule 60
The doctrine of merger makes it favorable for the lender to
set aside the mortgage judgment when it wants to sell a
nonperforming mortgage loan. Because these loans were
judicially foreclosed, a lender must return to court to set aside the
judgment. How and when that can be accomplished is governed
by the rules of civil procedure. Most courts follow either Rule 60
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or a close variation of it. 97
Indiana’s trial rule, while not identical, is the same as the federal

96
See infra Part III for a discussion on how the industry seems to be
working around this problem.
97
FED. R. CIV. P. 60.
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rules in terms of the issues relevant to this discussion.98 It is
unusual for the prevailing party to seek to set aside a judgment,
therefore the decisions discussing this issue are almost exclusively
concerned with not prejudicing the party for whom the judgment
was entered. The courts seem to assume that setting aside a
judgment will always be a good thing for the losing party. The
concept of a “zombie title” challenges that assumption.
One of the most troubling aspects of the “zombie title” is
the fact that lenders rarely supply reasons, let alone accurate
ones, to support a motion to vacate a foreclosure judgment.
Furthermore, lenders virtually never cite the relevant portion of
the law to support such a motion. A judgment can be set aside for
a number of reasons, including “mistake, surprise or excusable
neglect.” 99 The usual parties to a mortgage foreclosure action are
the homeowner, who in this case was already informed his home
was foreclosed, and the loan servicer, who now wants to unforeclose the loan. None of the files I reviewed mention “mistake,
surprise or excusable neglect” 100 as a reason to support the motion
to vacate judgment, nor do any of the reports of other studies
mention this as a reason for setting aside a judgment.
A judgment may also be set aside for “fraud” or “newly
discovered evidence”. 101 Again, no lender cited these as reasons to
set aside the judgment. The most common reason stated in
motions to set aside judgment was language implying that a
settlement had been reached. 102 Examples include: “all matters in
controversy have since been settled” 103 and “the subject matter of

IND. TRIAL R. 60. Both rules allow for the correction of clerical errors
and require the motion be filed within one year when claiming “mistake,
surprise or excusable neglect, newly discovered evidence or fraud.” FED. R.
CIV. P. 60(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3); IND. TRIAL R. 60(B)(1), (B)(2), (B)(3). Both rules
also allow litigants to file a motion within a reasonable time for three
additional reasons: “the judgment is void”, “the judgment has been satisfied,
released or discharged,” and “any other reason” justifying relief. FED. R. CIV.
P. 60(b)(4), (b)(5), (b)(6); IND. TRIAL R. 60. 60(B)(6), (B)(7), (B)(8). The Indiana
rule includes additional reasons for setting aside a default judgment for lack of
proper notice and judgments involving guardians or representatives. IND.
TRIAL R. 60(B)(4), (B)(5).
99
FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(1); IND. TRIAL R. 60(B)(1).
100
FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(1); IND. TRIAL R. 60(B)(1).
101
FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(2), (b)(3); IND. TRIAL R. 60(B)(2), (B)(3).
102
FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(5); IND. TRIAL R. 60(B)(7).
103
See, e.g., Motion to Set Aside Judgment, HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v.
Harvell, No. 20C01-1205-MF-00355 (Elkhart Cnty., Ind. Cir. Ct. DATE)
98
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this present litigation is no longer at issue.” 104
One motion stated that because the loan had been
charged-off, the lender wanted to set it aside. 105 While not a valid
reason under Trial Rule 60, it was at least an honest one. The
judge denied the motion. 106 Most of the files contain no
information about how the homeowners reacted to these motions
because servicers rarely notify homeowners of the decision to
charge-off the loan. 107 The lack of notice to other parties was
consistent in all the motions to vacate judgment I examined.
When notice is given, it is often to the already abandoned
property address. Occasionally a court sets the matter for hearing
on its own initiative. 108 That is when things get interesting. 109
Unfortunately, there is evidence that at least some of the
stated reasons for setting aside the judgment are not truthful. In
the Cleveland study, for example, the investigators discuss one
lender who claimed that “the parties had resolved the matter”
and, therefore, the foreclosure judgment should be set aside. 110
When questioned by the Court, the lender admitted that the real
reason it wanted to set aside the judgment was the lack of equity
in the property. 111 Settlement is a valid reason to set aside a
judgment, so long as the motion is brought within a reasonable
time. 112 Claiming there is a settlement when there is not a
settlement so that you can earn more money is never a
permissible reason to vacate or set aside a judgment.

Motion to Set Aside Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure and to
Dismiss Complaint to Foreclose Mortgage, Chase Home Fin., LLC v. Moore,
No. 02D01-0901-MF-66 (Allen Cnty., Ind. Super. Ct. Dec. 8, 2010).
105
Motion to Set Aside Judgment and Dismiss Lawsuit, Without
Prejudice, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Yusuph, No. 71-D05-0907-MF00671 (St. Joseph Cnty., Ind. Super. Ct. filed Apr. 12, 2010) [hereinafter
Yusuph Motion to Set Aside Judgment].
106
See infra Part II.A.2. for further discussion of this case.
107
Abandoned Foreclosures, supra note 17, at 38.
108
See, e.g., Hearing Transcript, supra note 88, at 3. Unfortunately, in
most cases notice is sent to an already vacant property.
109
See discussion infra notes135-153 and accompanying text.
110
SCHRAMM ET AL., supra note 16, at 7.
111
Id.
112
OHIO R. CIVIL P. 60. The motions to set aside default I discovered in
Indiana were filed between a few days after the judgment was entered to six
years after judgment.
104
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2. Agreed Judgments, “In-rem” Judgments
A disturbing subset of these cases involves motions to
vacate that seek to set aside an agreed, “in-rem” 113 judgment of
foreclosure. This came to my attention early in my research when
I stumbled upon JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Yusuph, a case
filed in 2009. 114 The pleadings indicate that at the time of this
foreclosure the home was in serious disrepair. 115 The City of
South Bend entered the case because it had a pending repair
order against the property for violations of the Unsafe Building
Act. 116 An agreed, “in rem” foreclosure judgment was entered in
December 2009. 117 In April 2010, Chase filed a motion to set aside
the judgment because the bank had “charged off this mortgage
loan account.” 118 Neither the homeowner who had defaulted, nor
the City which had agreed to the entry of the judgment, were
notified of the motion. 119 The bank did not request a hearing.
The judge originally signed an order vacating the
judgment. 120 However, the judge reconsidered and set the matter
for hearing. 121 After the hearing, the judge entered an order
An “in rem” judgment can only be satisfied with the proceeds from the
sale of the home. No personal liability attaches to the homeowner.
114
It should be noted that the affidavit filed in support of the judgment in
this matter was clearly a stamped signature. Exhibit A, Motion for Default
Judgment Entry and Decree of Foreclosure, Yusuph, No. 71-D05-0907-MF00671 (filed Nov. 4, 2009). This case was decided before Chase halted its
foreclosures for a period of time in September 2010 in response to robo-signing
accusations. See generally, ROBO-SIGNING, supra note 46, at 1 (for a
description of the robo-signing scandal).
115
Answer, Yusuph, No. 71-D05-0907-MF-00671, (filed July 16, 2009 by
the City of South Bend, Indiana) [hereinafter Yusuph Answer].
116
IND. CODE ANN. §36-7-9-26 (West 2013).
117
Agreed Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure, Yusuph, No. 71-D050907-MF-00671 (Dec. 17, 2009). An “in rem” foreclosure judgment in Indiana
is judgment that can only be executed against the secured property that was
subject to the foreclosure. Lenders have the option to also ask the court a
personal judgment that can be collected against any other assets of the
defendant. In this case, the bank only requested an “in rem” judgment.
118
Yusuph Motion to Set Aside Judgment, supra note 105.
119
While it is hard to prove a negative, there was no proof of service
attached to the motion, nor was there a notice of hearing in the court file.
120
Order Setting Aside the Judgment and Dismissing the Lawsuit,
Without Prejudice or Consent, Yusuph, No. 71-D05-0907-MF-00671 (filed
April 12, 2010).
121
Order, Yusuph, No. 71-D05-0907-MF-00671 (setting hearing for
December 7, 2010). The court cites the “extent to which the Motion to Vacate
113
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reinstating and confirming the judgment. 122 It was the correct
decision in this circumstance as setting aside a default judgment
is much different than setting aside a judgment that had been
agreed to by the parties. It is well recognized in Indiana that
“after entering an agreed judgment the trial court has no
authority to modify or change the judgment in any essential or
material way.” 123 In the JP Morgan case described above, the
homeowner had been defaulted but the City of South Bend, also
a defendant, had participated in the case and signed the
agreement for an “in rem” only judgment against the
homeowner. 124
While there is no conclusive evidence as to why the bank
sought to set this judgment aside, there are a number of clues in
the case files. First, the property was in serious disrepair. There
were pending orders to repair this property that had apparently
been ignored.125 The typical procedural step after a foreclosure
would be to set the property for sheriff’s sale. 126 However, the
property had already been dubbed “unsafe” by an administrative
proceeding of the city. 127 As a result, it was highly unlikely that
anyone would purchase the property because, if they did, they
would become responsible for the repairs. Accordingly, if the
bank purchased the property in the sale—the usual procedure
when there are no other bidders—it would be left to make the
Judgment and Dismiss the case compromises Defendant’s agreement to entry
of an in Rem Judgment” as the reason for setting the hearing.
122
Order, JP Morgan Chase Bank v. Yusuph, No. 71-D05-0907-MF00671 (reinstating and confirming the judgment).
123
Wagler v. West Boggs Sewer District, Inc., 980 N.E.2d 363, 376 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2012). This principal is not confined to Indiana. Most states follow
this rule. See, e.g., Bryan v. Reynolds, 123 A.2d 192 (Conn. 1956) (stipulated
judgments cannot be set aside unless it is shown they were obtained by fraud,
duress, accident or mistake); Westfall v. Wilson, 467 P.2d 966 (Or. 1970)
(consent judgments can only be changed by agreement of all parties); Laffin v.
Laffin, 760 N.W.2d 738 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008 ) (consent judgments cannot be
modified absent fraud, mistake or unconscionable advantage); Baran v. Baran,
72 A.2d 623 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1950) (consent decree can only be reviewed if
obtained by fraud or based on mutual mistake).
124
Agreed Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure, Yusuph, No. 71-D050907-MF-00671 (filed Dec. 17, 2009). The city of South Bend was defendant
because of fines and other actions to the property as a result of its being
abandoned.
125
Yusuph Answer, supra note 115.
126
IND. CODE ANN. §32-29-7-3 (West 2013).
127
Yusuph Answer, supra note 115.
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repairs. Therefore, it is not surprising that the bank decided this
asset was not worth acquiring and never set the sale. 128
As discussed previously, lenders appear unconcerned with
simply walking away from foreclosures when it is not economical
to proceed. Doing so requires no affirmative action and, at least
currently, violates no laws. 129 What made this loan different? For
one, it was an “in rem” judgment. 130 The lender’s recovery was
limited to the amount it could receive from the sale of the
property, and the difference between the sale amount and the
amount of the loan would be lost. The lender would not be able
to sell the property without making substantial repairs and, even
then, it was not likely to recover the entire amount of the loan. 131
The reason the lender articulated for asking the court to set aside
the judgment was that the bank had charged off the loan. 132 The
fact that a debt has been charged off is usually a reason to seek
judgment from the court, not a reason to set one aside. That is, of
course, if the creditor intends to collect on that judgment. In this
circumstance, Chase could not realistically collect on the debt.
They had not obtained a personal judgment, so they could not
attempt to collect against the homeowner’s wages or other assets.
The home, as mentioned previously, was not likely to sell at
sheriff’s sale.
However, there was one way that the bank could recover
some of its loss. It could sell the note. This foreclosure occurred at
about the same time that the buying and selling of distressed
mortgages was heating up.133 As Donna’s case illustrated, in order
Numerous allegations were being made at the time that banks were
failing to maintain properties it owned in low income neighborhoods. This
property was just such a neighborhood. See generally, BANKS ARE BACK,
supra note 34.
129
GAO-11-93, supra note 10, at 16.
130
Without ordering an expensive transcript, it is impossible to determine
why the judgment was in rem. A search of the bankruptcy records does not
reveal a bankruptcy, the most common reason for the entry of an “in rem”
judgment.
131
Various on-line websites list the value of this property between $27,600
(trulia.com, last visited September 4, 2013) and $28,327 (zillow.com, last
visited September 4, 2013). The judgment entered in December, 2009 showed
the homeowner owed $62,597.01, more than double the value of the home in
its current, repaired condition.
132
Yusuph Motion to Set Aside Judgment, supra note 105, at ¶ 3.
133
Janet Morrissey, New REITs Pounce on Distressed Mortgage Assets,
TIME
(Aug.
18,
2009),
available
at
http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,1916998,00.html#; Carolyn Said,
128
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to properly bundle this loan with other loans for sale, the note
must be un-merged from the judgment. 134 Therefore, the most
likely reason the bank sought to set aside the judgment was a
desire to sell the note on the secondary market.
A rare hearing that occurred in JP Morgan Chase v.
Pinckert 135 provides a glimpse of the serious issues these cases
raise. The court in Pinckert set a hearing on two cases in which
the same law firm had filed motions to set aside default
judgments. 136 The lender had filed a motion to vacate judgment
and to reinstate the note, but apparently did not supply a reason
that satisfied the court. 137 The court asked the attorney to explain
the reason for the motion. 138 His response was:
Well, I do, but only in a general sense. Sometimes we get
information that will say ‘short sale completed’ or ‘deed
in lieu’ or something of that nature, or ‘loan
modification completed.’ On both of these, the message
that we got . . . And that message just says ‘loss
mitigation. 139
The court stated, “I’m not quite sure how to understand a
loss mitigation if we may not even have one party,” expressing
concern that though there were two defendants, Merlin and
Ginger Pinckert, Ginger had only been served by publication. 140
After looking through the file, the court informed the attorney
that Mrs. Pinckert was deceased. 141 The Court then continued to
explore what “loss mitigation” might mean.
Court: You don’t know if the term “loss mitigation” is
Vulture investors buy up distressed mortgages, S.F. CHRON. (June 7, 2010),
available at http://www.sfgate.com/business/article/Vulture-investors-buy-updistressed-mortgages-3262447.php; Hui-yong Yu & Jason Kelly, Blackstone
Sees Two-Year Window to Buy Houses: Mortgages, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 14
2012 4:25 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-11-14/blackstone-seestwo-year-window-to-buy-houses-mortgages.html.
134
See discussion of merger, supra note 95.
135
See Hearing Transcript, supra note 88.
136
Id. at 3. There is no specific information about the second matter. It is
simply referred to in the opening of the hearing.
137
Id.
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
Id. at 3-4.
141
Id. at 4.
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used for something other than resolving the matter
personally with the borrower?
Attorney: It’s my experience it’s not for that. I mean,
let’s put it this way: it’s some form of loss mitigation, so
it may be—especially given the fact that Miss Pinckert
is deceased—it may be a deed in lieu or it may be some
type of short sale.
Court: I guess my concern is it doesn’t mean that one is
mitigating the loss to the financial
institution
by
changing its mind, and rather than foreclosing and
having a deficiency judgment and a piece of property
you may or may not want, it’s now decided to sell this
debt to 142
The attorney misunderstood the judge and interrupts her
to explain that the bank does not set aside judgments when it is
changing servicers. 143 The court, however, was not concerned
about a change in servicer. The court was concerned about a
change in ownership. That was clearly not what the court was
referencing. The court was clearly expressing a concern about
debt buyers, not servicer transfers.
Court: Yet we seem to be finding—I’ve had, within the
last couple weeks, quite a number of motions to vacate
and dismiss. And one attorney said he thought perhaps
Fannie Mae had directed this, that they were directing
it. But he didn’t have a lot more information. My big
concern is that someone has walked away from this
foreclosure, they may even have gotten an in rem
judgment. They’ve walked away, and they don’t
necessarily know that the judgment’s now been
vacated. What, the debt reinstated to be transferred to
someone else that’s going to seek some other remedy? 144
The court thus identified the crux of the problem with
“zombie titles.” When a judgment is set aside and the loan
reinstated, it can be transferred to someone else who is likely to
pursue another remedy. An “in rem” judgment can easily become
142
143
144

Id. at 4-5.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 6.

Fox Article - Final.docx (Do Not Delete)

Loyola Consumer Law Review

54

11/20/2013 4:10 PM

Vol. 26:1

an “in personam” judgment with no notice to the debtor.
At this point, the hearing took a rather bizarre twist. The
court asked why the underlying judgment was “in rem.” 145 The
lawyer claimed the homeowner filed bankruptcy, but as they
investigated the file, it turned out to be untrue. 146 However, the
lawyer ultimately discovered an agreed “in-rem” judgment in the
file:
Attorney: We have—-we have an agreed entry. We
haven’t sent that your way. I apologize. It’s signed by
XXX for Real Services, 147 legal guardian for Merlin
Pinckert.
Court: That’s not the judgment I signed and it’s not
been –I don’t see that in the file.
Attorney: Merlin Pinckert, right?
Court: So this person is under a guardianship?
Attorney: That’s correct.
Court: Not according to anything on the docket sheet or
in the file. 148
The attorney goes on to inform the court that the guardian

Id. at 8.
Id.
147
Real Services is a not-for-profit agency in South Bend that often acts as
guardians for indigent senior citizens who are deemed incompetent to manage
their affairs. The name of the guardian has been redacted.
148
Hearing Transcript, supra note 88, at 9. If a person is under a
guardianship, Indiana Trial Rule 4.2(c) suggests there is a duty to inform the
court if one of the litigants is incompetent, the situation if a guardian had been
appointed. IND. TRIAL R. 4.2(c). The attorney complained that he did not
know there was a guardianship because the dockets are not online in St.
Joseph County. Hearing Transcript, supra note 83, at 13. The guardianship
dockets are online through the Quest system in the St. Joseph Probate Court.
In addition, he had already informed the court that the agreement, signed by
the guardian, was in the file. Id. at 13. Had he looked at the free, online
system, the attorney would have seen that the Probate Court had approved the
sale of this property on July 23, a month before the hearing in Superior Court.
In fact, according to the Probate Court records, 71J02-1111-GU-00220, this
property was already sold. The question remains: what was the purpose of the
motion to vacate?
145
146
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had signed an in-rem agreement, but that a different in-rem
judgment was submitted to the court. 149
This is the one and only case in my review where the
lender’s reason for the motion to vacate and to set aside the
judgment was clear:
Attorney: So once they vacate it [the property in
foreclosure], if Mr. Pinckert is in an end-of-life situation,
his wife is already deceased, apparently none of his
family wants this home, it may fall into disrepair and
ultimately become the obligation of the city, which is
unfortunate, but –and I know there’s been discussions
about that in the legislature, but nothing has come of it.
And I think legally my client is entitled; they don’t have
an obligation in that regard. But that sounds, quite
frankly, more likely than loss mitigation. 150
The attorney in this matter either did not understand or
deliberately dodged the judge’s question regarding the selling of
the note. Though the court clearly understood and questioned the
propriety of setting aside an in rem judgment and exposing the
debtor to further collection. 151 The lawyer honestly replied that
“as a legal matter I don’t think that my client is prohibited from
doing that.” 152 As a legal matter, he may be correct; but as a moral
matter, there is likely a different answer. 153
It is clear that many of these “zombie titles” are being resold in the secondary market and it seems that many were sold to
PennyMac, a “finance company run almost entirely by alumni of
Countrywide Financial.” 154 This should be frightening to anyone
who has followed the mortgage industry. Countrywide loans were
a significant contributor to the mortgage foreclosure crisis. 155

Id. at 10.
Id. at 12.
151
Id. at 7.
152
Id.
153
A plaintiff or a defendant has the right to set aside a judgment
pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 60. Whether or not the rule is being fully
complied with is a major concern.
154
Stephen Gandel, Countrywide: It’s baaack, FORTUNE (Oct. 2, 2012,
6:00 AM), http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2012/10/02/countrywide-is-backpennymac/.
155
Commission Report, supra note 2, at 248-50.
149
150
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Below is a very small sample of the loans I discovered illustrating
the “zombie loan” pattern:
PENNYM AC
L ENDER

F ORECLOSURE
JUDGMENT

JUDGMENT

FILES

JUDGMENT

SET ASIDE

FORECLOSURE

ENTERED

12/30/2008

1/6/2010

10/10/2012 157

2/25/2013
dismissed

9/2/2010

2/14/2011

1/31/2012 159

8/14/2013
foreclosure

2/4/2009

7/6/2010

9/25/2012 161

5/8/2013

Citimortgage
156

Citimortgage
158

Citimortgage
160

Citimortgage
162

8/16/2012
1/24/2011
7/11/2011
5/17/2012
dismissed
CHART A: SMALL SAMPLE OF PROPERTIES WITH
MULTIPLE FORECLOSURES
163

In each case a foreclosure judgment was set aside and then
the loan was sold to PennyMac, allowing PennyMac to file a new
foreclosure action. Not all loans sold to PennyMac fell
immediately back into foreclosure. It is not possible to track those
loans through the court docket system. Chart A above is a very
small sample of cases I discovered where one lender foreclosed,
moved to set aside the judgment and then sold the loan. This is
representative of the fact that at least some “zombie titles” are
156
CitiMortgage v. Luse, No. 91C02-0811-MF-00105 (White Cnty., Ind.
Cir. Ct. Dec. 30, 2008).
157
PennyMac Corp. v. Luse, No. 91C01-1210-MF-000108 (White Cnty.,
Ind. Cir. Ct. Oct. 10, 2012).
158
CitiMortgage v. Westover, No. 89D01-0904-MF-052 (Wayne Cnty.,
Ind. Super. Ct. Sept. 02, 2010).
159
PennyMac Corp. v. Westover, No. 89D01-1201-MF-00041 (Wayne
Cnty., Ind. Super. Ct. I Aug. 14, 2013).
160
CitiMortgage v. Gillespie, No. 37C01-0912-MF-000634 (Jasper Cnty.,
Ind. Cir. Ct. Feb. 04, 2009).
161
PennyMac v.Corp. v. Gillespie, No. 37C01-1209-MF-000934 (Jasper
Cnty., Ind. Cir. Ct. May 08, 2013).
162
CitiMortgage v. Waller, No. 10C01-1101-MF-00036 (Clark Cnty., Ind.
Cir. Ct. May 11, 2011).
163
PennyMac Corp. v. Waller, No. 10C02-1205-MF-000248 (Clark Cnty.,
Ind. Cir. Ct. Aug. 2, 2012).
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being repackaged and resold, either alone or as part of new
securities.
The re-securitization of nonperforming loans, especially
when they are combined with new loans originated by
individuals who contributed so heavily to the last mortgage crisis,
should be cause for concern. 164 The securitization of subprime
loans was a major contributor to the 2008 economic downturn. 165
Regulators should not allow those loans at the center of the crisis
to be simply repackaged and reprocessed. They will re-explode.
B. The Dual Track
It would be both unfair and inaccurate to claim that all
efforts to vacate foreclosure judgment are deceptive, inaccurate
or done for the sole benefit of the lender. Sometimes the parties
really do reach an agreement. Evidence of this was also found in
court files. One example is HSBC Bank v. Harvell. 166 A complaint
for foreclosure was filed on May 7, 2012. 167 The homeowners
failed to respond and a default was entered on July 17. 168 On
August 9, the lender filed a praecipe asking the sheriff to set the
home for sheriff’s sale. 169 On August 16, the homeowners sent a
letter to the court, explaining that they were seeking a loan
modification and had just been asked for another set of
documents for the loan servicer. 170 On April 15, 2013, the bank
filed to vacate the judgment because the parties had reached an
agreement, presumably a loan modification. 171
The homeowner in this situation was able to stop the
foreclosure and the judgment was set aside. It is troubling,
Gandel, supra note 154.
Commission Report, supra note 2, at 125. See generally ADAM B.
ASHCRAFT & TIL SCHUERMANN, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y.,
UNDERSTANDING THE SECURITIZATION OF SUBPRIME MORTGAGE CREDIT
(Mar. 2008).
166
Chronological Case Summary, HSBC Bank v. Harvell, No. 20C011205-MF-00355 (Elkhart Cnty., Ind. Cir. Ct. Sept. 22, 2013) [hereinafter
Harvell Case Summary].
167
Id. at 1 (Minute Entry, May 9, 2012).
168
Id. (Minute Entry, July 19, 2012).
169
Id. (Minute Entry, Aug. 9, 2012); IND. CODE ANN. §32-29-7-3 (West
2013).
170
Harvell Case Summary, supra note 166, at 1 (Minute Entry, Aug. 23,
2012).
171
Id. at 2 (Minute Entry, Apr. 17, 2013).
164
165
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however, how quickly this case proceeded from filing to
judgment when the home owner was engaged in loss mitigation.
This is symptomatic of the dual tracking problem that has been
common in the industry. 172
Dual tracking is the process by which lenders pursue both
loss mitigation and foreclosure consecutively. 173 The homeowner
is often told not to worry about the foreclosure process and, as a
result, fails to appear in the foreclosure case filed in court. The
result is that many homeowners are faithfully working with the
bank to save their home, only to learn that a default has been
entered and the home foreclosed. 174 Dual tracking has been very
controversial. 175
In April of 2011, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac bowed to
considerable pressure and modified their servicing guidelines. 176
Servicers were instructed not to commence or conclude a
foreclosure if loss mitigation was in process. 177 On February 14,
2013, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau issued rules
meant to restrict the practice of “dual tracking.” 178 The tragedy is
that the restriction is too little too late. Many of the homeowners
who faced dual tracking have already lost their homes. Vacating
foreclosure judgments that occur in the context of “dual tracking”
may actually benefit some homeowners; however, eliminating the
practice would benefit many more homeowners.
Sharon Schmickle & Sarah Rose Miller, ‘Dual Tracking’ trap: Owners
lose homes while trying to modify mortgages, MINNEAPOLIS POST (Mar. 21,
2013),
http://www.minnpost.com/politics-policy/2013/03/dual-tracking-trapowners-lose-homes-while-trying-modify-mortgages.
173
CFPB Rules Establish Strong Protections for homeowners facing
foreclosure, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Jan. 17, 2013),
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/consumer-financial-protectionbureau-rules-establish-strong-protections-for-homeowners-facing-foreclosure/.
174
Id.
175
See generally, Schmickle, supra note 172; Shahien Nasiripour, National
Mortgage Settlement Review Prompts Dual-Track Discussions With Banks,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(June
19,
2013),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/19/national-mortgage-settlementdual-tracking_n_3468307.html?view=print&comm_ref=false.
176
Frannie Mae and Freddie Mac to Align Guidelines for Servicing
Delinquent Mortgages, FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY (Apr. 28, 2011),
http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/21190/sai42811final.pdf.
177
Id.
178
Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement
Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78 Fed. Reg. 10696 (proposed Feb. 14, 2013) (to
be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1024).
172
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C. Distressed Asset Stabilization Program
The number of motions to vacate seems to be increasing. 179
Several recent cases that have come before the St. Joseph
Superior Courts raise additional concerns.180 These cases are
significant both because of the reasons articulated for vacating
the judgments and the underlying circumstances of each of the
homeowners. The first case is Bank of America, N.A. v. Kimes. 181
The complaint to foreclose this mortgage was filed on September
17, 2012. 182 Mr. Kimes died of cancer four months earlier on May
18, 2012. 183 A default judgment was entered on May 10, 2013. 184
In July, the bank requested that the judgment be vacated because
“the subject matter of this present litigation is no longer at
issue.” 185 The court questioned how the matter could possibly be
resolved in loss litigation when Mr. Kimes was deceased. 186 The
attorneys for the bank explained that they were required to set
the judgment aside by the U.S Department of Housing and
Urban Development’s (H.U.D.) Distressed Asset Stabilization
Program. 187
Soon after, a second motion to set aside judgment was
filed in Nationstar Mortgage, LLC v. Estrada. 188 This foreclosure
was filed in 2012.189 The homeowner failed to respond and a
See, e.g., Hearing Transcript, supra note 88, at 12-13.
Id. at 6; Interview with Hon. Jenny Pitts Manier, St. Joseph Cnty.
Super. Ct. Judge (Sept. 4, 2013).
181
See Motion to Set Aside Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure and to
Dismiss Complaint to Foreclose Mortgage, Bank of America, N.A. v. Kimes,
No. 71-D0571D05-1209-MF-00617 (St. Joseph Cnty., Ind. Cir. Ct. July 10, 2012)
[hereinafter Kimes Motion to Set Aside Judgment].
182
Id.
183
Mark
Kimes
Obituary,
PALMER
FUNERAL
HOMES,
http://www.palmerfuneralhomes.com/obits/obituary.php?id=178421
(last
visited Oct. 27, 2010).
184
See Kimes Motion to Set Aside Judgment, supra note 181.
185
Id. at ¶ 1.
186
Interview with Hon. Jenny Pitts Manier, St. Joseph Cnty. Super. Ct.
Judge (Aug. 14, 2013) [hereinafter Judge Manier Interview].
187
Id.
188
Motion to Set Aside Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure and to Dismiss
Complaint to Foreclose Mortgage, Nationstar Mortgage LLC v. Estrada, No. 71D05-1212-MF-00787 (St. Joseph Cnty., Ind. Super. Ct. July 19, 2013) [hereinafter
Estrada Motion to Set Aside Judgment].
189
Complaint on Note and to Foreclose Mortgage on Real Estate,
Estrada, No. 71-D05-1212-MF-00787 (filed Dec. 10, 2012).
179
180
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default judgment was entered on May 10, 2013. 190 The motion to
set aside the judgment also claimed “the subject matter of this
present litigation is no longer at issue.” 191 Again, the judge
inquired as to the real reason for the motion and was again told it
was required by HUD or perhaps directed by Fannie Mae. 192
In July 2012, HUD announced the Distressed Asset
Stabilization Program, a program to offer pools of defaulted loans
to investors. 193 The stated intention of the program is to allow
“pools of mortgages headed for foreclosure to be sold to qualified
bidders and charges them with helping to bring the loan out of
default.” 194 In order to be part of the program the loan must be at
least six months delinquent, the servicer must have exhausted
loss mitigation options and the foreclosure must have been
initiated. 195 It is too early to know if the sale of these notes will
truly offer new hope for struggling homeowners and
neighborhoods. The initial pools of loans were sold in September
2012. 196 They were divided into one national pool and one
neighborhood stabilization pool of loans originating from
Chicago, Illinois; Newark, New Jersey; Phoenix, Arizona; and
Tampa, Florida—all areas previously identified as having high
numbers of abandoned foreclosures and vacant homes. 197
Consumer advocates are dubious of the Distressed Asset
Stabilization Program’s ability to provide relief to struggling
homeowners and neighborhoods.198
The National Consumer Law Center has issued several
Default Judgment Entry and Decree of Foreclosure, Estrada, No. 71D05-1212-MF-00787 (entered May 10, 2013).
191
Estrada Motion to Set Aside Judgment, supra note 188 at ¶ 1.
192
Judge Manier Interview, supra note 186.
193
HUD No. 12-116, supra note 71.
194
U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV. HUD NO. 12-187, HUD
ANNOUNCES PRELIMINARY RESULTS OF NOTE SALES UNDER EXPANDED
DISTRESSED ASSET STABILIZATION PROGRAM (Dec. 3, 2012) [hereinafter HUD
No.
12-187],
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/press/press_releases_media_advisories/2
012/HUDNo.12-187.
195
Id.
196
Nathaniel Cushman, HUD Announces September 2012 Loan Sale,
NIXON PEABODY AFFORDABLE HOUS. RES. CTR. (July 25, 2012, 11:02 AM),
http://web20.nixonpeabody.com/ahrc/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?List=023e142d%2
Dcf9f%2D44c8%2D8bf3%2D5aaaeeb635b8&ID=45.
197
Id.
198
FHA REFORM, supra note 71; HOME RETENTION GOALS, supra note 71.
190
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responses and recommendations regarding this program. 199 One
of the concerns is that the program will reward those servicers
who delay “loss mitigation reviews beyond the time frames
allowed” by allowing them to sell the loan without really having
done loss mitigation.200 The program may also be encouraging
lenders to “un-foreclose” some long abandoned properties in an
effort to remove these properties from their books instead of
focusing on saving the homes in default that have not yet been
foreclosed. The short amount of time between some of these
judgments and motions to vacate suggests that better
communication between the servicers and their counsel could
prevent the delay in resolving the foreclosure caused by
foreclosing and then vacating judgments. It may also prevent
some people from abandoning their home because they thought
the foreclosure judgment was the end of their opportunity to save
the home. 201 The theory behind the program is that the investor
will be able to work with the homeowner to remain in the home,
but in reality by the time the loans reach the program most of
these homeowners will be long gone. One concern is that this
kind of program may result in once stable neighborhoods
becoming transient, rental neighborhoods.202 At the same time,
rental homes are better than abandoned homes.
The cases coming before the St. Joseph Superior Court
raise other, serious concerns. It is not credible that the reason for
setting aside a judgment for a deceased borrower is to increase
the opportunity for the borrower to engage in loss mitigation. Are
these programs really designed to increase the opportunity for
loss mitigation, as advertised, 203 or are they instead encouraging,
or even mandating, the setting aside of previously entered
judgments so that HUD, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac can
unload assets? I submitted an inquiry to HUD asking whether or
not loan servicers were being instructed to set aside judgments in
Id.
HOME RETENTION GOALS, supra note 71.
201
GAO-11-93, supra note 10, at 17-18 (finding that homeowners are much
more likely to abandon a property if the loan is charged off after foreclosure than if
it is charged off before foreclosure is initiated).
202
Julie Schmit, Home rentals—the new American Dream?, USA TODAY (
last
updated
June
6,
2012,
10:02
AM),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/economy/housing/story/2012-06-05/arehome-rentals-the-new-american-dream/55402648/1.
203
See HUD No. 12-187, supra note 194.
199
200
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order for the underlying loans to be included in this program. 204 I
was told that their attorney would get back to me. 205 No one
has. 206

IV. DEFICENCY JUDGMENTS AND DEBT BUYERS
It should now be clear that a motivating factor—if not the
motivating factor—in the abandoned and zombie foreclosures is
lenders ability to sell the notes into the secondary market. The
secondary market is a market of investors and debt buyers. The
debts differ depending on whether they are secured, as in the
selling of a note to an investor, or unsecured, as in the selling of a
note, without the mortgage, or the deficiency judgment. The
relationship between the abandoned foreclosure problem and the
debt collection problem was well articulated by St. Joseph
Superior Court Judge Jenny Manier:
Well, if I’m a defendant against whom an in rem
judgment has been entered, I’ve lost the property and I
have no deficiency judgment. Judgment’s vacated,
which what, gives rise or resuscitates the debt and the
bank says, you know, we don’t want to be stuck with
this piece of property and this debt that we’ll be
collecting for the next 20 years, let’s sell the underlying
debt to someone else for dimes on the dollar, pocket the
money and count on it as loss mitigation. And then the
purchases is now going after this person, this defendant
who thought they had walked away by losing just their
home but without any deficiency. And all of a sudden
someone is suing them for the same judgment that they
thought had been resolved. 207
A. The Deficiency Judgment
As mentioned previously, it is clear that some foreclosure

204
E-mail from author to John Hall, Indianapolis Field Officer, HUD,
(Aug. 14, 2013) (on file with author).
205
Email from John Hall, supra note 204, to author. (Aug. 14, 2013) (on
file with author).
206
There has been no response as of September 10, 2013.
207
Hearing Transcript, supra note 88, at 7 (explaining to lender’s counsel
why she is concerned with setting aside an in rem judgment of foreclosure).
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judgments are being vacated solely to facilitate the sale of the
loan. 208 Others are vacated because the homeowner obtained a
loan modification or reinstated the loan. It is also clear that some
homeowners, in the end, cannot climb out from under the debt
and the property is foreclosed, leaving them with a deficiency
judgment. Below is one extreme example of this, taken from
Howard County, Indiana. These are all foreclosures on the same
property, against the same property owner, filed from 2003
through 2008:
DATE
PLAINTIFF
MERS 209
MERS 210
Irwin
Mortgage 211
ABN
AMRO 212
Citimortgage
213

AMOUNT

F ORECLOSURE
F ILED
10/ 3/2003
1/3/2005

DATE OF
JUDGMENT
12/ 18/ 2003
3/6/2005

8/17/2006

10/17/2006

5/1/2007

OF

AND NOTE

JUDGMENT
$141,544.39
$146,944.51

REINSTATED

10/24/2006

7/31/2007

$146,957.37
$140,
062.83

3/11/2008

4/16/2008

$140,462.45

11/21/2008

1/20/2009

$140,075.96

Citimortgage
214

VACATED

2/9/2004
8/25/2005

11/20/2007
11/25/2008
8/19/2009
judgment
assigned

CHART B: THE HISTORY OF ONE LOAN IN INDIANA

It is also possible that some of these are simply servicer changes. It is
virtually impossible to determine who owns a loan when looking at the
pleadings.
209
Civil Case Detail, Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Newburn, No.
34D02-0310-MF-00950 (Howard Cnty., Ind. Super. Ct.) (Doxpop).
210
Civil Case Detail, Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Newburn, No.
34D01-0501-MF-00062 (Howard Cnty., Ind. Super. Ct.) (Doxpop).
211
Civil Case Detail, Irwin Mortg. Corp. v. Newburn, et. al., No. 34D02-0608MF-00776 (Howard Cnty., Ind. Super. Ct.) (Doxpop).
212
Civil Case Detail, ABN AMRO Mortg. Grp., Inc. v. Newburn, No. 34
D040705-MF-00476 (Howard Cnty., Ind. Super. Ct.) (Doxpop).
213
Civil Case Detail, Citimortgage, Inc. v. Newburn, No. 34C01-0803-MF00240 (Howard Cnty., Ind. Cir. Ct.) (Doxpop).
214
Civil Case Detail, Citimortgage, Inc. v. Newburn, No. 34C01-0811-MF01164 (Howard Cnty., Ind. Cir. Ct.) (Doxpop).
208
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The property in question is located in Kokomo, Indiana.
On October 3, 2003 Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems
(MERS) filed a foreclosure action, obtaining a default judgment
two months later. 215 On February 9, 2004 that judgment was
vacated and, according to the court, the “note and mortgage
canceled by merger in the judgment are hereby reinstated.” 216
Eleven months later, MERS filed another foreclosure. 217 Again, a
default judgment was entered. The amount of the judgment has
now increased from $141, 544.39 to $146, 944.51, a difference of
$5,400.12. 218 It appears from the figures that few, if any,
payments were made in the intervening year. Five months after
entry of the default judgment, the court again vacated the
judgment and reinstated the loan. 219
The next foreclosure on this property was filed by Irwin
Mortgage in August of 2006, a year after the previous judgment
was vacated. 220 It too obtained a default judgment. 221
Interestingly, this judgment was only slightly larger than the
previous judgment, suggesting some payments had been made.
One month later, Irwin set the judgment aside and reinstated the
note. 222 The speed at which this judgment was set aside, coupled
with the significant decrease in the next judgment amount (see
Chart B, above), suggests the homeowners may have reinstated
the loan by bringing it current at this point. Apparently, though,
it did not last.
On May 1, 2007, ABN AMRO filed to foreclose on the
same mortgage, now for the fourth time in as many years. 223
Again, it obtained a default foreclosure judgment and quickly
moved to vacate the judgment and re-instate the note. 224
215
Civil Case Detail at 2, Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Newburn,
No. 34D02-0310-MF-00950 (Minute Entry, Dec. 18, 2003).
216
Id. at 3, (Minute Entry, Feb. 9, 2004).
217
Id. at 1, (Minute Entry, Jan. 21, 2004).
218
Id. at 2 (Minute Entry, March 6, 2005).
219
Id. at 3 (Minute Entry, Aug. 25, 2005).
220
Civil Case Detail at 2, Irwin Mortg. Corp. v. Newburn, No. 34D02-0608MF-00776 (Minute Entry, Aug. 17, 2006).
221
Id. at 2-3 (Minute Entry, Oct. 24, 2006).
222
Id. at 3 (Minute Entry, Nov. 2, 2006).
223
Civil Case Detail at 1-2, ABN AMRO Mortg. Grp., Inc. v. Newburn, No.
34D04-0705-MF-00476 (Minute Entry, May 1, 2007).
224
Id. at 2 (minute entries of default judgment on July 31, 2007 and vacating
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Citimortgage entered the picture on March 11, 2008 when it filed
the fifth attempt to foreclose on this property. 225 It obtained a
judgment and also vacated it, reinstating the note and mortgage
on November 25, 2008. 226
The reason for vacating this judgment is clear: four days
earlier, on November 21, 2008, Citimortgage had filed another
foreclosure action on this same note and mortgage. 227 Indiana,
like most states, does not permit a plaintiff to bring a second
action to foreclose when it is currently “prosecuting any other
action for the same debt.” 228 It is odd that Citimortgage would
chose to set aside a judgment it had already obtained in the first
filing, as opposed to dismissing the second, extraneous filing, but
it did. The last and final foreclosure judgment was entered on
January 20, 2009 against the owners for $140,075.96 plus interest
and costs. 229
The county land records show that on November 10 the
property was transferred from the homeowners to Fannie Mae,
and then to a third party purchaser. 230 The price paid by the
purchaser was $22,000. 231 The homeowners now owe a deficiency
judgment of over $120,000. 232 That judgment was promptly
assigned to a debt buyer, Dyke O’Neal. 233 Dyke O’Neal claims to
be “a leading nationwide purchaser, collector and servicer of real

judgment on Nov. 20, 2007).
225
Civil Case Detail at 2, Citimortgage, Inc. v. Newburn, No. 34C01-0803MF-00240 (Minute Entry, Mar. 11, 2008).
226
Id. at 2-3 (minute entries: entering foreclosure judgment on Apr. 16, 2008;
vacating judgment and reinstating note on Nov. 25, 2008).
227
Civil Case Detail at 3, Citimortgage, Inc. v. Newburn, No. 34C01-0811MF-01164 (Minute Entry, Nov. 21, 2008).
228
IND. CODE § 32-30-10-10 (2013).
229
“Court now grants the Application and now finds in favor of the
Plaintiff, Citimortgage, Inc. and against the Defendants, in the sum of
$140,075.96, plus interest and costs, all per DEFAULT JUDGMENT
ENTERED. Furthermore, Court now finds the property commonly known as
1105 Witherspoon, Kokomo, IN 46901 herein foreclosed and ordered sold by
the Sheriff of Howard County all per Decree of Foreclosure.” Civil Case
Detail, Citimortgage v. Newburn, No. 34C01-0811-MF-01164 (Minute Entry,
Jan. 20, 2009).
230
Id.
231
Id.
232
Id.
233
Civil Case Detail, Citimortgage v. Newburn, No. 34C01-0811-MF01164 (Minute Entry, Aug. 19, 2009).
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estate deficiencies.” 234 They set to work immediately to collect the
deficiency in this matter. 235 Unsurprisingly, the homeowner filed
bankruptcy, notifying the court on April 25, 2012. 236
A deficiency judgment is the amount of money a
homeowner may still owe the lender if, after foreclosure, the
home is not worth as much as the underlying mortgage debt. 237
Deficiency judgments have always been an issue in hard
economic times. In this crisis, policy makers focused on the loan
modification as a solution. 238 In the depression, the relief offered
was restrictions on deficiency judgments. 239 Challenges to this
relief were decided in the borrowers’ favor when, in Gelfert v.
National City Bank of New York,240 the United States Supreme
Court held that a state may restrict the lender’s recourse in a
mortgage foreclosure. Several states have restricted or eliminated
234
DYKE O’NEAL, INC., http://www.dyckoneal.com/ (last visited
September 9, 2013). It should be noted that the state of Georgia has a Cease
and Desist Order against this company for operating as a mortgage lender and
broker without a license. DEPARTMENT’S ORDER TO CEASE AND DESIST
AGAINST DYCK-O’NEAL, INC. BECOMES FINAL, GA. DEP’T OF BANKING AND
FIN. (May 22, 2009) [hereinafter Georgia Cease and Desist Order],
http://dbf.georgia.gov/press-releases/2009-06-30/departments-order-ceasedesist-against-dyck-oneal-inc-becomes-final/. The state of Massachusetts has a
consent order relating to violations of the Massachusetts debt collection laws.
DYKE O’NEAL, INC. – CONSENT ORDER, MASS. OFFICE OF CONSUMER
AFFAIRS
AND
BUS.
REGULATION
(May
5,
2011),
http://www.mass.gov/ocabr/business/banking-services/banking-legalresources/enforcement-actions/2011-dob-enforcement-actions/dyck-oneal-incconsent-order.html.
235
It should also be noted that Dyke O’Neal does not, according to the
Indiana Secretary of State, have the required license to act as a debt collector
in Indiana.
236
Civil Case Detail, Citimortgage v. Newburn, No. 34C01-0811-MF01164 (Minute Entry, Apr. 25, 2012).
237
Deficiency judgments are allowed in some form in the majority of the
states. Twelve, including some of those hit hardest by this crisis such as
California and Arizona, have passed statutes barring deficiency judgments in
most circumstances. Twenty other states limit the impact of the deficiency by
requiring the lender to calculate the deficiency based on market value and not
the price obtained in sheriff sale. Unfortunately, Indiana falls in neither camp
and allows deficiency judgments in every situation. Foreclosure Defense, supra
note 31, app. E, at 547-49.
238
White, supra note 52, at 514.
239
D. J. Farage, Mortgage Deficiency Judgment Acts and Their
Constitutionality, 41 DICK. L. REV. 67 (1937).
240
Gelfert v. Nat’l City Bank of New York, 313 U.S. 221, 235, 61 S. Ct. 898,
85 L. Ed. 1299 (1941).
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the right to a deficiency judgment. 241 Most states allow for at least
some collection of deficiency judgments. 242 Indiana has no real
restrictions.
The Newburn cases illustrated above are extreme, or are
they? Numerous loans have been coming in and out of
foreclosure since the start of this crisis. 243 This case shows us just
how large a deficiency a homeowner can accumulate in a
depressed housing market. It also raises serious questions about
the servicing of this loan. A significant amount of legal time and
energy went into the filing of six successive foreclosure actions,
two even pending at the same time. The case is symptomatic of a
chaotic industry. The homeowner incurred attorney’s fees in each
of the filings.
The lack of meaningful communication between the
servicer and its foreclosure attorney is another problem evident in
this and many foreclosure cases. The foreclosing attorney is often
communicating to its client through the same toll free numbers as
the consumers. 244 An example of this can be seen in the exchange
between the court and JP Morgan Chase’s foreclosure counsel in
the hearing to set aside a foreclosure judgment previously
discussed.245 The only message the attorney received from his
client was “loss mitigation.” 246 He was not told that, a month
earlier, this home had been sold in a short sale with the full
knowledge and approval of his client. 247 While it is desirable to
encourage loss mitigation, real loss mitigation requires real
communication between all the stakeholders in the process.
It does not appear from the court file that much loss
mitigation occurred for this homeowner in Kokomo. However,
because the homeowner could well have been working with the
lender and the lender did not communicate this information to its
counsel, it is equally possible that loss mitigation was occurring
241
Foreclosure Defense, supra note 31, app. E, at 547-53. Twelve states
bar deficiency judgments. Id. at 548.
242
Of the thirty-eight states that allow some form of deficiency, twenty
have enacted at least some restrictions. Id.
243
See, generally White, supra note 52 (Allen M. White on the old mod
model).
244
Since 2011, I have facilitated hundreds of settlement conferences
between the homeowner and their counsel. This is a common complaint of
lender’s counsel.
245
See supra text accompanying notes 135-53.
246
Hearing Transcript, supra note 88, at 3.
247
See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
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throughout the process. 248 At the same time, there were not many
successful loss mitigation options available when the first four
cases were filed. 249 The homeowner failed to appear in all of the
six cases filed and the foreclosure fees mounted. Yet, each time a
judgment was entered it was set aside and the note sold. A home
in foreclosure for over five years must increase the fees and the
ultimate balance due. In the end, this home sold for less than 15%
of the judgment. The delay in foreclosing is at least partially
responsible for this increase.
The growing balance is one of the problems with the
collection of deficiency judgments. Once entered, the judgment
continues to accrue interest in Indiana at the judgment interest
rate, currently 8%. 250 Another is the complete lack of information
provided to the homeowner. There is a record of the court
judgment in the court file and, presumably, a copy of that order is
sent to the borrower. However, there is no record of the amount,
if any, of the deficiency. Only some courts make any note of it at
all. Some states require confirmation of the judgment. 251 The
third, and most disturbing, is that by allowing lenders to set aside
agreed “in rem” judgments courts have resurrected the possibility
of a deficiency judgment that the homeowner believed he had
avoided by agreeing to judgment in the first place. 252 Once
obtained, the deficiency debt enters the murky world of debt
collection, already awash in bad information and controversial
practices. 253
B. The Debt Buyer
It is not clear how many debt buyers are in the market for
mortgage debt. 254 The federal trade commission recently
See supra Part II.B. for a discussion of dual tracking.
White, supra note 52 (documenting the lack of success of loss
mitigation efforts in 2007 and 2008).
250
IND. CODE § 24-4.6-1-101(1)(2013).
251
Foreclosure Defense, supra note 31, app. E, at 550-52.
252
Hearing Transcript, supra note 88, at 6.
253
See generally FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, REPAIRING A BROKEN
SYSTEM: PROTECTING CONSUMERS IN DEBT COLLECTION LITIGATION AND
ARBITRATION
(July
2010),
available
at
www.ftc.gov/os/2010/07/debtcollectionreport.pdf.
254
At the moment, at least, the market seems to be stronger for the
nonperforming loans, hence the moves to set aside judgments. See Rudolf,
supra note 70; Said, supra note 70; Yu & Kelly, supra note 133; Morrissey,
248
249
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concluded an investigation of the debt buying industry that
included specific data on the top nine debt buying firms.255 From
2005 through 2011, mortgage debt accounted for approximately
one percent of the debt acquired.256 The average price paid was
fifty cents on the dollar. The report goes on, however, to clarify
that these numbers are skewed by the fact that some portfolios
were tied to performing loans. In fact, “a significant number of
mortgage portfolios” were acquired for less than one cent per
dollar. 257 The mean price was ten cents per dollar. 258
Dyke O’Neal purchased the debt in the case illustrated in
Chart B. 259 This company claims it has been in the business of
buying mortgage deficiencies since 1988. 260 According to their
webpage, Dyke O’Neal is “the leading nationwide purchaser,
collector and servicer of real estate deficiencies.” 261 The size and
opportunities these markets now bring for both legitimate
investors and bottom-feeding debt collectors has changed due to
this crisis. As debt collectors, who traditionally shied away from
mortgage deficiency collection, enter the market, they are likely to
bring the problems associated with the collection of credit cards
into the world of mortgage deficiencies. 262The problems
supra note 133.
255
See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, THE STRUCTURE AND PRACTICES
OF THE DEBT BUYING INDUSTRY (January 2013) [hereinafter Debt Buying],
available at www.ftc.gov/os/2013/01/debtbuyingreport.pdf. The nine firms that
provided specific data to the study were Sherman Financial, Arrow Financial
Services, LLC., Encore Capital, Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC, Unifund
Corp., eCast, B-Line LLC., Asta Funding, NCO Portfolio Mgmt. Id. at 7.
Because the data is limited to these firms, it is not a complete picture of the
debt buying marketplace.
256
Id. at T-4.
257
Id. at T-5.
258
Id.
259
See supra notes 233-36 and accompanying text.
260
DYKE-O’NEAL, INC., http://www.dyckoneal.com (last visited
September 9, 2013).
261
Id. But see supra note 234 (describing Cease and Desist Order issued by
the Georgia Department of Banking and Finance, and Consent Order issued
by Massachusetts Office of Consumer Affairs and Business Regulation).
262
Recent crackdowns on the selling and collecting of credit card debt
could easily cause debt buyers to search for other revenue streams. See
generally, Maria Aspan & Jeff Horwitz, Chase Halts Card Debt Sales Ahead of
Crackdown,
AMERICAN
BANKER
(July
1,
2013,
3:29
PM),
http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/178_126/chase-halts-card-debt-salesahead-of-crackdown-1060326-1.html (explaining that Chase has halted selling
its credit card debt because of investigations into robo-signing). The
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associated with the collection of mortgage debt are already
surfacing in relation to the collection of second mortgage loan
debt. 263
The debt collection industry is structured to allow debts to
be bought and sold with little underlying documentation and
supporting paperwork. 264 When you combine this with the
recorded paperwork disaster that has become common in the
world of mortgage foreclosure, 265 the results can be nothing but
bad.

V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Abandoned foreclosures and zombie titles pose concerns
for consumers and their communities. Policy makers need to act
to mitigate the impact of these problems before they become a
crisis themselves, the “foreclosure echo.” A review of foreclosure
processes in Indiana and abandoned homes across the nation
leads me to recommend the following:
A. The Foreclosure Process
The current judicial foreclosure process may have some
issues, but the answer is not to speed up the process, as industry
advocates claim. It is, instead, to determine whether the
foreclosure can be avoided before you initiate the judicial
foreclosure process. If loss mitigation were truly incentivized over
foreclosure, the number of homes moving into foreclosure and
then stalling could be reduced. When a home is truly abandoned,
investigation will likely spread, as they did in the foreclosure crisis, prompting
other credit card lenders to also stop selling their debt, at least temporarily.
263
Carolyn Said, Homes Lost, but Some 2nd-Mortgage Debts Remain, S.F.
CHRON.
(April
19,
2010,
4:00
AM),
http://www.sfgate.com/realestate/article/Homes-lost-but-some-2nd-mortgagedebts-remain-3266964.php (explaining the rise in mortgage debt collection on
second mortgages); Jim Wasserman, Debt Collectors can Come Calling Years
After a Mortgage Default, WASH. POST, March 27, 2010, at E06.
264
Debt Buying, supra note 255, at iii.
265
Commission Report, supra note 2, at 407-08 (discussing how the flawed
paperwork exacerbated foreclosure issues); Allen et al., supra note 16, at 29
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efforts should be made to quickly foreclosure in a way that allows
the asset to be purchased and re-occupied before it falls into
disrepair. The focus should be on the “home” asset and not the
“loan” asset.
Lenders should not be rewarded for shoddy loss mitigation
by allowing them to vacate the judgment and sell the loan.
Decisions about the economic viability of the foreclosure
should be made before the foreclosure action is filed to decrease
the number of homeowners who prematurely leave their homes.
Servicers must communicate accurate and timely
information to their counsel to avoid wasted judicial time and the
filing of frivolous motions.
Homeowners should be notified when a lender has
decided to charge-off a loan, cancel a sale or otherwise abandon a
foreclosure.
Dual tracking is alive and well, despite efforts to the
contrary. It needs to finally and completely end.
The loss mitigation system is still too slow, too long and
too confusing. The industry can, and should, agree to one short
set of paperwork that can be completed and processed in a
manner that does not drag on for years.
Lenders that have no interest in the asset should waive
their mortgages to allow homeowners and municipalities ways to
transfer the property to an occupying buyer.
B. The Court Process
The court process begins and ends with knowledgeable
judges. Judges need to understand the implications of vacating
judgments on the homeowner and the community. Courts are
best able to control the time a foreclosure remains in process.
Unfortunately, courts are also overburdened and understaffed.
Policymakers need to address those issues as well.
Judges need to be educated as to the many implications of
setting aside a foreclosure judgment.
Requiring creditors to comply with Trial Rule 60 would
end most of the abuses.
Courts should better control their dockets by dismissing
foreclosure actions that have been open with no activity for long
periods of time.
All deficiency amounts should be accurately recorded in
the record and readily accessible to the consumer.
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C. Policy-Makers
This problem will grow as the economy improves.
Creditors and debt collectors, who previously saw no hope of
recovery, will soon have wages to garnish. Simple steps can be
taken now to prevent this from becoming a second foreclosure
debt crisis.
The re-securitization of zombie mortgage debt needs to be
closely monitored by regulators.
The debt buying industry must be required to have
complete and accurate information of the deficiency judgment
and the documents to prove it, before collection proceedings can
be initiated.
Lenders should be required to inform homeowners when
they cancel a sheriff’s sale, not just when they initiate one.
These suggestions are all simple, easily implemented steps.
I am not the first to offer many of them. We are in a position to
mitigate the possible fallout of the foreclosure crisis. Policymakers
can choose to get ahead of the problem or wait to clean up
another mess. I encourage them to choose the former. As the
evidence shows, it is not the homeowners who are walking away
from their mortgage; it is the mortgage industry that has walked
away from the homeowners. It is long since passed the time to
turn them around.

